A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.

(Oxford)

Bli först med att recensera och betygsätt boken A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation - du kan vinna 200 kr varje månad i tävlingen "Månadens recension".

B. Douglas Bernheim, Edward Ames Edmonds Professor of Economics, Stanford University beautifully written should be required reading for any young economic theorist

Ariel Rubinstein, Professor of Economics, Tel Aviv University and New York University A must for anyone who wishes to discover the treasures hidden within the cooperative approach.

Robert Wilson, Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, Stanford Graduate School of Business Ray's substantial accomplishments in this area will inspire researchers and students alike.

Dilip Abreu, Edward E. Matthews, Class of 1953, Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics a masterful account

(Oxford)

Preface; 1. Introduction; PART 1 THE SETTING; 2. Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements; 3. Coalitions, Cooperation, and Non-Cooperation; PART 2 THE BARGAINING APPROACH TO COALITIONS FORMATION; 4. Irreversible Commitments; 5. Irreversible Commitments: Symmetric Games; 6. Applications; 7. Irreversible Commitments: The General Case; 8. A Framework for Reversible Commitments; 9. Reversible Commitments, Characteristic Functions, and Efficiency; 10. Games with Externalities; PART 3 THE BLOCKING APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION; 11. Blocking; 12. Binding Agreements; 13. The Blocking Approach in Real Time

(Oxford)