Understanding Intelligence

This work examines the labyrinth of complexities that confront the Intelligence Community in its efforts to provide accurate and timely intelligence in support of American foreign policy and national security interests. Kennedy begins with an analysis of the collection processes and the obstacles that must be overcome if accurate and meaningful information is to be obtained. He addresses such issues as the need for strategic vision and clarity in setting priories, as well as constraints imposed by the executive branch and the complexities associated with translating priorities into collection programs. The focus then shifts to the obstacles that confront those tasked to analyze collected information, examining such issues as the impact of people, technology, and budgets on the overall analytical effort.The third area of emphasis for Kennedy centers on the "quality control" of collection and analysis, addressing both Executive Branch and Congressional Oversight of the intelligence processes. Finally, he examines issues associated with the distribution and use of the intelligence products - the so-called "end game" obstacles. Issues addressed in the work include the lack of presidential support for and confidence in the Intelligence Community, the impact of "worst-case planning," and the "coloring" of intelligence to suit policy preferences. Ultimately, the component parts provide the reader with a broad understanding of the Intelligence Community and the difficulties it faces as it strives to keep the United States safe and informed.

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<p>"Kennedy (Georgia Institute of Technology) has provided an accurate, objective critique of the intelligence community. His focus is primarily upon post-9/11 policies and failures. However, he does not neglect earlier history. He points out the complexities of the intelligence process, which are often compounded by a lack of necessary oversight and interference by the executive branch. Often policy makers want immediate information that is slanted to their political views on particular situations, as was the case with Iraq. Such demands often lead to faulty intelligence and policy embarrassments and failures. Typically, Washington's response to such shortcomings has been to reorganize and add more layers of bureaucracy, which has not necessarily eliminated roadblocks. Intelligence estimates are also hampered by an inherently unknowable and dynamic future. This is a valuable work that should not be ignored by the policy-making community. Highly recommended. Graduate, research, and pro

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ROBERT KENNEDY, Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, previously served as director of the joint German-American George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany.

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