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Game Theory Evolving
A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction, Second Edition
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Fler böcker av Herbert Gintis
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"Game Theory Evolving is an exceptionally well-written and constructed introduction to the field. And with Gintis' outline of agent-based modeling and his tips for programming, many readers may be motivated to take up his invitation and experiment with a problem in evolutionary dynamics of their own."--Jennifer M. Wilson, Mathematical Reviews "Gintis has wholeheartedly embraced the evolutionary approach to games. . . . The author is an accomplished economist raised in the classical mold, and his background shows in many aspects of the book . . . [He] has important things to say."--Karl Sigmund, Science
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Herbert Gintis holds faculty positions at the Santa Fe Institute, Central European University, and University of Siena. He has coedited numerous books, including Moral Sentiments and Material Interests, Unequal Chances (Princeton), and Foundations of Human Sociality.
Preface xvChapter 1: Probability Theory 11.1 Basic Set Theory and Mathematical Notation 11.2 Probability Spaces 21.3 De Morgan's Laws 31.4 Interocitors 31.5 The Direct Evaluation of Probabilities 31.6 Probability as Frequency 41.7 Craps 51.8 A Marksman Contest 51.9 Sampling 51.10 Aces Up 61.11 Permutations 61.12 Combinations and Sampling 71.13 Mechanical Defects 71.14 Mass Defection 71.15 House Rules 71.16 The Addition Rule for Probabilities 81.17 A Guessing Game 81.18 North Island, South Island 81.19 Conditional Probability 91.20 Bayes' Rule 91.21 Extrasensory Perception 101.22 Les Cinq Tiroirs 101.23 Drug Testing 101.24 Color Blindness 111.25 Urns 111.26 The Monty Hall Game 111.27 The Logic of Murder and Abuse 111.28 The Principle of Insufficient Reason 121.29 The Greens and the Blacks 121.30 The Brain and Kidney Problem 121.31 The Value of Eyewitness Testimony 131.32 When Weakness Is Strength 131.33 The Uniform Distribution 161.34 Laplace's Law of Succession 171.35 From Uniform to Exponential 17Chapter 2: Bayesian Decision Theory 182.1 The Rational Actor Model 182.2 Time Consistency and Exponential Discounting 202.3 The Expected Utility Principle 222.4 Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function 262.5 The Scientific Status of the Rational Actor Model 30Chapter 3: Game Theory: Basic Concepts 323.1 Big John and Little John 323.2 The Extensive Form 383.3 The Normal Form 413.4 Mixed Strategies 423.5 Nash Equilibrium 433.6 The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory 443.7 Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria 443.8 Throwing Fingers 463.9 Battle of the Sexes 463.10 The Hawk-Dove Game 483.11 The Prisoner's Dilemma 50Chapter 4: Eliminating Dominated Strategies 524.1 Dominated Strategies 524.2 Backward Induction 544.3 Exercises in Eliminating Dominated Strategies 554.4 Subgame Perfection 574.5 Stackelberg Leadership 594.6 The Second-Price Auction 594.7 The Mystery of Kidnapping 604.8 The Eviction Notice 624.9 Hagar's Battles 624.10 Military Strategy 634.11 The Dr. Strangelove Game 644.12 Strategic Voting 644.13 Nuisance Suits 654.14 An Armaments Game 674.15 Football Strategy 674.16 Poker with Bluffing 684.17 The Little Miss Muffet Game 694.18 Cooperation with Overlapping Generations 704.19 Dominance-Solvable Games 714.20 Agent-based Modeling 724.21 Why Play a Nash Equilibrium? 754.22 Modeling the Finitely-Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 774.23 Review of Basic Concepts 79Chapter 5: Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria 805.1 Price Matching as Tacit Collusion 805.2 Competition on Main Street 815.3 Markets as Disciplining Devices: Allied Widgets 815.4 The Tobacco Market 875.5 The Klingons and the Snarks 875.6 Chess: The Trivial Pastime 885.7 No-Draw, High-Low Poker 895.8 An Agent-based Model of No-Draw, High-Low Poker 915.9 The Truth Game 925.10 The Rubinstein Bargaining Model 945.11 Bargaining with Heterogeneous Impatience 965.12 Bargaining with One Outside Option 975.13 Bargaining with Dual Outside Options 985.14 Huey, Dewey, and Louie Split a Dollar 1025.15 Twin Sisters 1045.16 The Samaritan's Dilemma 1045.17 The Rotten Kid Theorem 1065.18 The Shopper and the Fish Merchant 1075.19 Pure Coordination Games 1095.20 Pick Any Number 1095.21 Pure Coordination Games: Experimental Evidence 1105.22 Introductory Offers 1115.23 Web Sites (for Spiders) 112Chapter 6: Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria 1166.1 The Algebra of Mixed Strategies 1166.2 Lions and Antelope 1176.3 A Patent Race 1186.4 Tennis Strategy 1196.5 Preservation of Ecology Game 1196.6 Hard Love 1206.7 Advertising Game 1206.8 Robin Hood and Little John 1226.9 The Motorist's Dilemma 1226.10 Family Politics 1236.11 Frankie and Johnny 1236.12 A Card Game 1246.13 Cheater-Inspector 1266.14 The Vindication of the Hawk 1266.15 Characterizing 2 x 2 Normal Form Games I 1276.16 Big John and Little John Revisited 1286.17 Dominance Revisited 1286.18 Competition on Main Street Revisited 1286.19 Twin Sisters Revisited 1296.20 Twin Sisters: An Agent-Based Model 1296.21 One-Card, Two-Round Poker with Bluffing 131