Indexical ‘I’

The purpose of this text is twofold: to give a theory of reference for the indexical "I" and to explain what is involved in thinking about oneself. The first part constitutes a critique of different solutions to the problem of how "I" refers, while the second part advances an account of "I" and I-thoughts. It is argued that "I" refers indirectly through a "de re" sense that is based on non-conceptual content. "I" expresses an individual concept with two components: a "de re" sense and a context-independent self-concept. Other issues that are discussed concern self-knowledge, such as whether there is something in specific that we have to know about ourselves to be able to self-refer, and the kind of self-consciousness that is required for self-reference. Furthermore, the notions of unity of consciousness and personal identity, as they both are presupposed by a competent use of "I", are examined. The book is intended for philosophers of mind and language with a general interest in theories of reference and meaning, and more specifically in the first person, the self, and self-knowledge.