R. J. Overy – författare

War and Economy in the Third Reich examines the nature of the German economy in the 1930s and the Second World War. When Hitler came to power in 1933 he had two aims for the economy: a rapid recovery from the depths of the Great Slump and the creation of a vast economic foundation for Germany's renewed bid for world power. He wanted to turn Germany into a military superpower in the 1940s.These eleven essays explore the tension between Hitler's vision of an armed economy and the reality of German economic and social life. Richard Overy argues that the German economy was much less crisis-ridden in 1939 than its enemies supposed, and that Hitler, far from limiting his war effort, tried to mobilize the economy for `total war' from 1939 onwards. Only the poor organisation of the Nazi state and the interference of the military prevented higher levels of military output.Many of these essays challenge accepted view of the Third Reich. They are collected here for the first time. In his substantial new introduction Richard Overy reflects on the issues they raise, and the ways in which the subject is changing. Often thought-provoking, always informed, War and Economy opens a window on a essential aspect of Hitler's Germany.

War and Economy in the Third Reich examines the nature of the German economy in the 1930s and the Second World War. Richard Overy's essays, collected here for the first time with a substantial new introduction, explore the tension between Hitler's vision of an armed economy and the reality of German economic and social life. Often thought-provoking, always informed, War and Economy opens a window on an essential aspect of Hitler's Germany.

The performance of the German economy between the Great Crash and the Second World War has been the subject of intense academic debate. The problems of economic growth were acute in inter-war Germany, and the depression of the early 1930s intensified these problems, driving many Germans towards the political extremes. The Nazi seizure of power in 1933 was followed by the introduction of an extensive 'package' of government policies to expand demand and increase investment. These policies were not Keynesian, for by 1939 the government had extended its range of controls over the whole economy and it became part of the Nazi political system for waging war. In this new edition of The Nazi Economic Recovery 1932-1938, R. J. Overy discusses the main areas of the debate, arguing that the war preparation that took place at this time was ultimately incompatible with long-term economic recovery, and that the German economic miracle did not occur until after 1945.