The Building Blocks of Thought

Stephen Laurence is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. He received his PhD in Philosophy at Rutgers University and taught at the University of Manchester, Hampshire College, the London School of Economics, and the University of Hull. He is Director of the Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies and directed the AHRC Innateness and the Structure of the Mind Project and the AHRC Culture and the Mind Project. He is co-editor of The Conceptual Mind and Concepts: Core Readings (both The MIT Press) among other books, and has published numerous articles in both philosophical and scientific journals. Eric Margolis is Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. He received his PhD in Philosophy at Rutgers University and taught at Rice University and the University of Wisconsin prior to his appointment at the University of British Columbia. He has received research funding from The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, The Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies, and Canada's Social Science and Humanities Research Council. He is co-editor of The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science (OUP, 2012), and The Conceptual Mind (The MIT Press), among other books, and has published extensively in philosophical journals.

1: Introduction: Whatever Happened to the Debate Over Innate Ideas? PART I: The Rationalism-Empiricism Debate 2: What the Rationalism-Empiricism Debate is Really About 3: Why the Rationalism-Empiricism Debate Isn't the Nature-Nurture Debate 4: The Viability of Rationalism 5: Abstraction and the Allure of Illusory Explanation 6: Concepts, Innateness, and Why Concept Nativism is about More Than Just Innate Concepts 7: Conclusion to Part I PART II: Seven Arguments for Concept Nativism 8: The Argument from Early Development (1) 9: The Argument from Early Development (2) 10: The Argument from Animals 11: The Argument from Universality 12: The Argument from Initial Representational Access 13: The Argument from Neural Wiring 14: The Argument from Prepared Learning 15: The Argument from Cognitive and Behavioural Quirks 16: Conclusion to Part II PART III. Alternative Empiricist Perspectives 17: Methodological Empiricism 18: Neo-Associationism 19: Artificial Neural Networks: From Connectionism to Deep Learning 20: Neuroconstructivism 21: Perceptual Meaning Analysis 22: Embodied Cognition 23: Conclusion to Part III PART IV. Fodorian Concept Nativism 24: The Evolution of Fodor's Case Against Concept Learning 25: Not All Concepts Are Innate 26: Fodor's Biological Account of Concept AcquisitionDLand the Importance of Cultural Learning 27: Conclusion to Part IV 28: Coda: Innate Ideas Revisited