The Fundamentals of Ethics

<br>"The Fundamentals of Ethics is a superb book: accessible, illuminating, and comprehensive. Shafer-Landau begins where students first confronting moral philosophy begin: with their everyday assumptions, expectations, and vocabulary. Through engaging questions and lively thought experiments, keeping jargon and overt instruction to an absolute minimum, he leads the reader to an articulate and self-aware grasp of the fundamental issues. In sum: the best such introductory text I know of."--Niko Kolodny, University of California, Berkeley<p><br>"This is a great introduction to ethics, the finest that I am aware of. I am eager to use it in my classes. . . . It is similar in structure to the wildly popular Rachels introductory ethics text but better. . . . Shafer-Landau's writing is perfect for his intended audience."--David Sobel, University of Nebraska, Lincoln<p><br>"The main strength in my mind is the clarity of the writing. Shafer-Landau has a gift for conveying the core ideas of different ethical theories, as well as fairly presenting their various strengths and weaknesses. Students will come away from reading The Fundamentals of Ethics with a very good understanding of philosophical thinking about a wide variety of issues in ethical theory."--Christian Miller, Wake Forest University<p><br>

Russ Shafer-Landau is Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison. He is the editor of Oxford Studies in Metaethics.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ; A NOTE ON THE COMPANION VOLUME ; A NOTE TO READERS ; INTRODUCTION ; THE LAY OF THE LAND ; ETHICAL STARTING POINTS ; MORAL REASONING ; THE ROLE OF MORAL THEORY ; LOOKING AHEAD ; PART I: THE GOOD LIFE ; 1. HEDONISM: ITS POWERFUL APPEAL ; HAPPINESS AND INTRINSIC VALUE ; THE ATTRACTIONS OF HEDONISM ; THERE ARE MANY MODELS OF A GOOD LIFE ; PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND WELL-BEING ; MISERY CLEARLY HAMPERS A GOOD LIFE; HAPPINESS CLEARLY IMPROVES IT ; THE LIMITS OF EXPLANATION ; RULES OF THE GOOD LIFE-AND THEIR EXCEPTIONS ; HAPPINESS IS WHAT WE WANT FOR OUR LOVED ONES ; 2. IS HAPPINESS ALL THAT MATTERS? ; THE PARADOX OF HEDONISM ; EVIL PLEASURES ; THE TWO WORLDS ; FALSE HAPPINESS ; THE IMPORTANCE OF AUTONOMY ; LIFE'S TRAJECTORY ; UNHAPPINESS AS A SYMPTOM OF HARM ; CONCLUSION ; 3. GETTING WHAT YOU WANT ; A VARIETY OF GOOD LIVES ; PERSONAL AUTHORITY ; AVOIDING OBJECTIVE VALUES ; MOTIVATION ; JUSTIFYING THE PURSUIT OF SELF-INTEREST ; KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD ; 4. PROBLEMS FOR THE DESIRE THEORY ; GETTING WHAT YOU WANT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY FOR PROMOTING YOUR GOOD ; GETTING WHAT YOU WANT MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR PROMOTING YOUR GOOD ; DESIRES BASED ON FALSE BELIEFS ; IGNORANCE OF DESIRE SATISFACTION ; DISINTERESTED AND OTHER-REGARDING DESIRES ; PASSING FANCIES ; DISAPPOINTMENT ; IMPOVERISHED DESIRES ; THE PARADOX OF SELF-HARM ; THE FALLIBILITY OF OUR DEEPEST DESIRES ; CONCLUSION ; PART II: DOING THE RIGHT THING ; 5. MORALITY AND RELIGION ; THREE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT RELIGION AND MORALITY ; GOD AND MORAL MOTIVATION ; GOD AS THE CREATOR OF MORALITY ; RELIGION AS A SOURCE OF MORAL GUIDANCE ; CONCLUSION ; 6. NATURAL LAW THEORY ; THE THEORY AND ITS ATTRACTIONS ; TWO CONCEPTIONS OF HUMAN NATURE ; HUMAN NATURE IS WHAT IS INNATELY HUMAN ; HUMAN NATURE IS WHAT ALL HUMANS HAVE IN COMMON ; NATURAL PURPOSES ; THE ARGUMENT FROM HUMANITY ; CONCLUSION ; 7. PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM ; EGOISM AND ALTRUISM ; THE ARGUMENT FROM OUR STRONGEST DESIRES ; THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPECTED BENEFIT ; THE ARGUMENT FROM THE AVOIDANCE OF MISERY ; TWO EGOISTIC STRATEGIES ; LETTING THE EVIDENCE DECIDE ; CONCLUSION ; 8. ETHICAL EGOISM ; WHY BE MORAL? ; TWO POPULAR ARGUMENTS FOR ETHICAL EGOISM ; THE BEST ARGUMENT FOR ETHICAL EGOISM ; THREE PROBLEMS FOR ETHICAL EGOISM ; CONCLUSION ; 9. CONSEQUENTIALISM: ITS NATURE AND ATTRACTIONS ; THE NATURE OF CONSEQUENTIALISM ; ITS STRUCTURE ; MAXIMIZING GOODNESS ; MORAL KNOWLEDGE ; ACTUAL VS. EXPECTED RESULTS ; ASSESSING ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS ; THE ATTRACTIONS OF UTILITARIANISM ; IMPARTIALITY ; THE ABILITY TO JUSTIFY CONVENTIONAL MORAL WISDOM ; CONFLICT RESOLUTION ; MORAL FLEXIBILITY ; THE SCOPE OF THE MORAL COMMUNITY ; 10. CONSEQUENTIALISM: ITS DIFFICULTIES ; MEASURING WELL-BEING ; UTILITARIANISM IS VERY DEMANDING WITH RESPECT TO ; DELIBERATION ; MOTIVATION ; ACTION ; IMPARTIALITY ; NO INTRINSIC WRONGNESS (OR RIGHTNESS) ; THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE ; POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE ; RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM ; CONCLUSION ; 11. THE KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE: FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE ; CONSISTENCY AND FAIRNESS ; THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALIZABILITY ; MORALITY AND RATIONALITY ; ASSESSING THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALIZABILITY ; INTEGRITY ; KANT ON ABSOLUTE MORAL DUTIES ; 12. THE KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE: AUTONOMY AND RESPECT ; THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY ; THE IMPORTANCE OF RATIONALITY AND AUTONOMY ; THE GOOD WILL AND MORAL WORTH ; VAGUENESS ; DETERMINING JUST DESERTS ; ARE WE AUTONOMOUS? ; MORAL LUCK ; THE SCOPE OF THE MORAL COMMUNITY ; CONCLUSION ; 13. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION: THEORY AND ATTRACTIONS ; THE LURE OF PROCEDURALISM ; THE BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY ; THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA ; COOPERATION AND THE STATE OF NATURE ; THE ADVANTAGES OF CONTRACTARIANISM ; MORE ADVANTAGES: MORALITY AND THE LAW ; 14. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS ; WHY BE MORAL? ; THE ROLE OF CONSENT ; DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE CONTRACTORS ; THE SCOPE OF THE MORAL COMMUNITY ; CONCLUSION ; 15. ETHICAL PLURALISM AND ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES ; THE STRUCT