The Handbook of Market Design

Mark S. Rzepczynski, CFA Institute Publications The breadth of innovative research on market designs should open the readers imagination to the vast possibilities in this exciting subject area.

Zvika Neeman is a microeconomic and game theorist who specializes in mechanism design. He teaches at the Berglas School of Economics at Tel Aviv University. Prior to that, he held positions at Boston University and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Introduction ; PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES ; 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design? ; 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior ; 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory ; PART II: CASES ; SECTION II.A: MATCHING MARKETS ; 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange ; 5. School Choice ; 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice ; 7. Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved? ; 8. Designing Markets for Ideas ; 9. Redesigning Microcredit ; SECTION II.B: AUCTIONS ; 10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods ; 11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions ; 12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds ; SECTION II.C: E-COMMERCE ; 13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior ; 14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents ; 15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets ; 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing ; 17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith ; SECTION II.D: LAW DESIGN ; 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems ; 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences ; PART III: EXPERIMENTS ; 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction ; 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment ; 22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions ; 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill ; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS ; 24. Competing Mechanisms ; 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets