A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

B. Douglas Bernheim, Edward Ames Edmonds Professor of Economics, Stanford University beautifully written should be required reading for any young economic theorist

Ariel Rubinstein, Professor of Economics, Tel Aviv University and New York University A must for anyone who wishes to discover the treasures hidden within the cooperative approach.

Robert Wilson, Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, Stanford Graduate School of Business Ray's substantial accomplishments in this area will inspire researchers and students alike.

Dilip Abreu, Edward E. Matthews, Class of 1953, Professor of Finance and Professor of Economics a masterful account

Debraj Ray is Julius Silver Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Studies in Economics at New York University. He has held long-term appointments at Stanford University, the Indian Statistical Institute, and Boston University. He has held numerous visiting appointments at Harvard University, MIT, the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (Rio De Janeiro), the People's University of China (Beijing), and the London School of Economics. He is a Permanent Research Affiliate of the Instituto de Analisis Economico (Barcelona). Professor Ray is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a recipient of the Mahalanobis Memorial Medal, and a recipient of the Outstanding Young Scientists Award (in the area of mathematics) from the Indian National Science Academy. He received the Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford and the Gittner Award for Teaching Excellence in Economics at Boston University.

Preface; 1. Introduction; PART 1 THE SETTING; 2. Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements; 3. Coalitions, Cooperation, and Non-Cooperation; PART 2 THE BARGAINING APPROACH TO COALITIONS FORMATION; 4. Irreversible Commitments; 5. Irreversible Commitments: Symmetric Games; 6. Applications; 7. Irreversible Commitments: The General Case; 8. A Framework for Reversible Commitments; 9. Reversible Commitments, Characteristic Functions, and Efficiency; 10. Games with Externalities; PART 3 THE BLOCKING APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION; 11. Blocking; 12. Binding Agreements; 13. The Blocking Approach in Real Time