In Two Minds

Philosophy in Review Inarguably, this edited collection by Evans and Frankish is the definitive statement of the status quo in this area of work

<br>Jonathan Evans has conducted a major research programme on thinking and reasoning since the 1970's. His publications include seven authored books and well over 150 scientific papers. His research includes study of cognitive biases in reasoning and judgement, and of the psychology of conditionals. He is one of the founders of the dual-process theory of reasoning and in recent years has extended this interest to broadly based dual-system theories of the mind. Keith Frankish is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at The Open University. His research spans debates about the nature of belief, the structure of the mind, and consciousness. His publications include two authored books, three co-edited volumes, and numerous journal articles and book chapters. His 2004 book Mind and Supermind argued that a dual-systems perspective is implicit in everyday belief-desire psychology and explored the implications of this view for issues in philosophy of mind.<br>

1. The duality of mind: a historical perspective; PART I - FOUNDATIONS; 2. How many dual process theories do we need: one, two or many?; 3. Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: is it time for a tri-process theory?; 4. Systems and levels: dual-system theories and the personal-subpersonal distinction; 5. An architecture for dual reasoning; 6. The magical number two, plus or minus: dual process theory as a theory of cognitive kinds; PART II - PERSPECTIVES; 7. Intuitive and reflective inferences; 8. Dual-process theories: a metacognitve perspective; 9. Dual-process models: a social psychological model; 10. Thinking across cultures: implications for dual processes; 11. The two systems of learning: an architectural perspective; PART III - APPLICATIONS; 12. Cognitive and social cognitive development: dual-process research and theory; 13. What zombies can't do: a social cognitive neuroscience approach to the irreducibility of reflective consciousness; 14. In two minds about rationality?; 15. Reason and intuition in the moral life: a dual-process account of moral justification