Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz

<br>Joseph E. Stiglitz is the winner of the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, and a lead author of the 1995 report of the IPCC, which shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize. He was chairman of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors under President Clinton and chief economist and senior vice president of the World Bank for 1997-2000. Prior to Columbia he held the Drummond Professorship at All Souls College, Oxford, and professorships at Yale, Stanford, and Princeton. He is the author of the best-selling Globalization and Its Discontents, Making Globalization Work, Fair Trade For All, and most recently of Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the Global Economy. His engagement with Africa began more than 40 years ago, at the Institute of Development Studies in Nairobi.<br>

Preface to Volume II; I: SURVEYS AND PERSPECTIVES; Introduction; 1. Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective; 2. Information and Competition; II: CAPITAL MARKETS; IIA: INFORMATION AND CAPITAL MARKETS; Introduction; 3. Information and Capital Markets; 4. Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading; 5. Ownership, Control and Efficient Markets: Some Paradoxes in the Theory of Capital Markets; 6. The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings, with I. Gale; 7. A Simple Proof that Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Imperfect, with I. Gale; IIB: CREDIT AND EQUITY RATIONING; Introduction; 8. Incentive Effects of Termination: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets, with A. Weiss; 9. Credit Rationing and Collateral, with A. Weiss; 10. Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection, with T. Hellmann; IIC: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF CAPITAL MARKETS; Introduction; 11. Information, Finance and Markets: The Architecture of Allocative Mechanisms, with B. Greenwald; 12. Banks as Social Accountants and Screening Devices for the Allocation of Credit, with A. Weiss; 13. Banks versus Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment; 14. Short-term Contracts as a Monitoring Device, with P. Rey; 15. Pure Theory of Country Risk, with J. Eaton and M. Gersovitz; 16. Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, with A. Edlin; III: INFORMATION AND LABOR MARKETS AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF INCENTIVES; IIIA: INCENTIVES; Introduction; 17. A Survey of the Economics of Incentives; 18. Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy; 19. Prizes and Incentives: Toward a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, with B. Nalebuff; 20. Design of Labor Contracts: Economics of Incentives and Risk-Sharing; IIIB: EFFICIENCY WAGES; Introduction; 21. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.'s: The Labor Turnover Model; 22. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment: The Efficiency Wage Model; 23. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device, with B. Nalebuff and A. Rodriguez; IIIC: WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS, SEARCH, AND THE EFFICIENCY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM; Introduction; 24. Equilibrium Wage Distribution; 25. Labor Turnover, Wage Structure & Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets, with R. Arnott; IV. THE PURE THEORY OF MORAL HAZARD AND INSURANCE; Introduction; 26. Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard; 27. Price Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Decentralizability in Insurance Markets, with R. Arnott; 28. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, with Moral Hazard with R. Arnott; V. INFORMATION AND PRODUCT MARKETS; Introduction; 29. Imperfect Information in Product Markets; 30. The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Identical Agents, with S. Salop; 31. Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information; 32. Competition and the Number of Firms in a Market: Are Duopolies More Competitive Than Atomistic Markets?