The Handbook of Market Design

Mark S. Rzepczynski, CFA Institute Publications The breadth of innovative research on market designs should open the readers imagination to the vast possibilities in this exciting subject area.

<br>Nir Vulkan, Associate Professor of Economics, Said Business School, University of Oxford, Alvin E. Roth, Professor of Economics, Stanford University and Nobel Laureate in Economics 2012, Zvika Neeman, Associate Professor, Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University <br>Alvin E. Roth was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for his work on market design. He received his B.S. from Columbia University in 1971 and Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1974. He taught at the University of Illinois from 1974-82, at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982-98, at Harvard University from 1998-2012, and he now teaches at Stanford. <p>Nir Vulkan is an Economics Professor at the Said Business School and a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford University. He has written many articles on market design and is author of 'The Economics of E- Commerce' (Princeton University Press, 2003). He has worked with many software and e-commerce companies designing markets mainly on the Internet, which are used by humans and software agents. His algorithms for automated trading have been used by hedge funds to trade futures in markets all over the world. <p>Zvika Neeman is a microeconomic and game theorist who specializes in mechanism design. He teaches at the Berglas School of Economics at Tel Aviv University. Prior to that, he held positions at Boston University and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.<br>

Introduction ; PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES ; 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design? ; 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior ; 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory ; PART II: CASES ; SECTION II.A: MATCHING MARKETS ; 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange ; 5. School Choice ; 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice ; 7. Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved? ; 8. Designing Markets for Ideas ; 9. Redesigning Microcredit ; 10. The Design of Online Advertising Markets ; SECTION II.B: AUCTIONS ; 11. The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods ; 12. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions ; 13. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds ; SECTION II.C: E COMMERCE ; 14. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior ; 15. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents ; 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing ; 17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith ; SECTION II.D: LAW DESIGN ; 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems ; 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences ; PART III: EXPERIMENTS ; 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction ; 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment ; 22. Buyer Determined Procurement Auctions Experiments ; 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill ; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS ; 24. Competing Mechanisms ; 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets