Knowing Right From Wrong

Simon Blackburn, Times Literary Supplement I am happy to commend an excellent contribution to a perennially contested area. All philosophers can profit from this book, and should admire the meticulous craftsmanship and the modesty and intelligence of its explorations.


Simon Blackburn, Times Literary Supplement careful, lucid, and attractive . . . I am happy to commend an excellent contribution to a perennially contested area. All philosophers can profit from this book, and should admire the meticulous craftsmanship and the modesty and intelligence of its explorations.


Charlie Kurth, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Kieran Setiya's book . . . aims to silence three skeptical challenges that build from concerns about moral disagreement, the reliability of our moral belief forming mechanisms, and the possibility that we might come to have true moral beliefs completely by accident. Setiya's response to these challenges is sophisticated and nuanced: he identifies what the structure of justification and the nature of ethics must be like if these skeptical concerns are to be refuted,
and he builds a case that justification and ethics are actually like this. The result is a rich and interesting defense of moral knowledge and justification . . . a rich and provocative contribution to moral epistemology and to ethical theory more generally


Paul Schofield, Journal of Moral Philosophy Setiya has written a book that is imaginative and novel, both in the way he develops the skeptical worries at its core, and in the way he addresses them.

<br>Kieran Setiya is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. He works in action theory, epistemology, and ethics, and is the author of Reasons without Rationalism (Princeton University Press, 2007).<br>

Contents; Preface; Introduction; 1. Disagreement; 2. Reliability; 3. Knowledge; 4. Human Nature; Bibliography; Index