A Course in Game Theory (häftad)
Format
Häftad (Paperback / softback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
368
Utgivningsdatum
1994-07-01
Förlag
MIT Press
Medarbetare
Rubinstein, Ariel
Illustrationer
notes, references, index
Dimensioner
230 x 155 x 25 mm
Vikt
600 g
Antal komponenter
1
ISBN
9780262650403
A Course in Game Theory (häftad)

A Course in Game Theory

Häftad Engelska, 1994-07-01
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A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
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"I recommend this book highly, it is beautifully done..." Robert Aumann , Hebrew University

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Övrig information

Martin J. Osborne is Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto. Ariel Rubinstein is Professor of Economics at Tel Aviv University and New York University.

Innehållsförteckning

Part 1 Introduction: game theory; games and solutions; game theory and the theory of competitive equilibrium; rational behaviour; the steady state and deductive interpretations; bounded rationality; terminology and notation. Part 2 Strategic games: Nash equilibrium; mixed, correlated, and evolutionary equilibrium; rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions; knowledge and equilibrium. Part 3 Extensive games with perfect information: extensive games with perfect information; bargaining games; repeated games; complexity considerations in repeated games; implementation theory. Part 4 Extensive games with imperfect information: extensive games with imperfect information; sequential equilibrium. Part 5 Coalitional games: the core; stable sets, the bargaining set, and the Shapley value; the Nash solution.