From Symbol of Confrontation to Keystone of Stability
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Köp båda 2 för 1664 kr?A book subjected to the cruel whims of history. Obviously completed before current events overtook even the most fantastic scenarios, the authors deny all but the most remote possibility of German reunification. But, failed prophecy aside, the book traces the relationship between the Western powers and the Soviet Union with regard to Berlin, from World War II through the consequences of the 1971 Four Power Agreement governing the subsequent operation of the city.?-Reference & Research Book News "A book subjected to the cruel whims of history. Obviously completed before current events overtook even the most fantastic scenarios, the authors deny all but the most remote possibility of German reunification. But, failed prophecy aside, the book traces the relationship between the Western powers and the Soviet Union with regard to Berlin, from World War II through the consequences of the 1971 Four Power Agreement governing the subsequent operation of the city."-Reference & Research Book News
JAMES S. SUTTERLIN is with the Yale University Institution for Social and Policy Studies. He served as vice-consul in Berlin, 1946 to 1948, and was a personal witness to post-war Berlin and the Berlin Blockade. He was the Director of the Office of Central European Affairs in the Department of State, 1969 to 1972, and was responsible for most of the guidance and instructions sent to the American Representative in the quadripartite negotiations on a Berlin Agreement. DAVID KLEIN is special assistant to the president of Fairleigh Dickenson University. He served as a Senior Member on the National Security Council during the Kennedy years and was witness to Kennedy's handling of a Berlin crisis. He was the American Minister in Berlin during the 1969-1971 quadripartite negotiations. He was present at the negotiating sessions and was familiar with all the main actors including those on the Soviet side.
Preface The Enduring Fruits of Confusion The Lines are Drawn The Khrsuhchev Years and the Next Crisis The Development of Local Government in Berlin From Crisis to Negotiations Objectives and Expectations The U.S. Negotiating Structure The Negotiating Process Agreement Achieved Language as a Substantive Problem The Inner-German Agreements Berlin in the United Nations Did Everyone Win? Appendix: The Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971 Select Bibliography Index