Approval Voting (häftad)
Format
Häftad (Paperback / softback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
200
Utgivningsdatum
2007-01-01
Upplaga
2nd ed. 2007
Förlag
Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
Medarbetare
Fishburn, Peter C.
Illustratör/Fotograf
9 tables 4 illus
Illustrationer
9 Tables, black and white; 4 Illustrations, black and white; XXII, 200 p. 4 illus.
Dimensioner
226 x 154 x 10 mm
Vikt
313 g
Antal komponenter
1
Komponenter
1 Paperback / softback
ISBN
9780387498959
Approval Voting (häftad)

Approval Voting

Second Edition

Häftad Engelska, 2007-01-01
989
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar.
Fri frakt inom Sverige för privatpersoner.
This book presents a simple and logical potential electoral reform. Under this system, voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate, its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and a probable increase in voter turnout.
Visa hela texten

Passar bra ihop

  1. Approval Voting
  2. +
  3. Game Theory and National Security

De som köpt den här boken har ofta också köpt Game Theory and National Security av Steven Brams, D Marc Kilgour (inbunden).

Köp båda 2 för 1588 kr

Kundrecensioner

Har du läst boken? Sätt ditt betyg »

Recensioner i media

"This book is the second edition of a classic book. In the preface to this new edition, the authors write: ``We have decided not to revise Approval Voting, except to make minor corrections to the initial text". I can only refer to my review of the first edition and add that I think that, even after nearly 25 years, this is the best place to learn about Approval Voting, a major voting procedure. This is the extemely rare example of a book that does not look its age." --Maurice Salles for Zentralblatt MATH

Bloggat om Approval Voting

Innehållsförteckning

Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution.- Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest?.- The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate?.- The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules.- Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest?.- Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data.- Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections.- Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions.- Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election.- Epilogue.