Charging for Government (Routledge Revivals) (häftad)
Format
Häftad (Paperback / softback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
202
Utgivningsdatum
2012-06-07
Förlag
Routledge
Illustratör/Fotograf
black & white illustrations
Illustrationer
black & white illustrations
Dimensioner
215 x 136 x 13 mm
Vikt
291 g
Antal komponenter
1
Komponenter
22:B&W 5.5 x 8.5 in or 216 x 140 mm (Demy 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam
ISBN
9780415609289

Charging for Government (Routledge Revivals)

User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and Practice

Häftad,  Engelska, 2012-06-07
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Originally published in 1991, user charges and earmarked taxes are methods by which people pay directly for the services they recieve from government. As such they are frequently supported by those who oppose increased taxation, who argue that they are more like market transactions than traditional forms of taxation. This book explores the cogency of these arguments in the light of public choice analyses of political processes.
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Fler böcker av Richard Wagner

Övrig information

Wagner, Richard

Innehållsförteckning

1. Tax norms, fiscal reality, and the democratic state: user charges and earmarked taxes in principle and practice 2. The fiscal significance of user charges and earmarked taxes: a survey 3. User charges, rent seeking, and public choice 4. The political economy of user charges: some bureaucratic implication 5. Subjective cost, property rights, and public pricing 6. The practice and politics of marginal cost pricing: the case of the French electric monopoly 7. The political economy of tax earmarking 8. Rent seeking and tax earmarking 9. Tax earmarking and the optimal lobbying strategy 10. The constitutional economics of earmarking 11. Excises, earmarked taxes, and government user charges in a rent seeking model 12. User fees and earmarked taxes in constitutional perspective