The Dynamics of Norms (häftad)
Format
Häftad (Paperback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
236
Utgivningsdatum
2009-04-09
Förlag
Cambridge University Press
Medarbetare
Jeffrey, Richard / Skyrms, Brian
Illustrationer
16 line figures
Volymtitel
The Dynamics of Norms
Dimensioner
229 x 152 x 14 mm
Vikt
350 g
Antal komponenter
1
Komponenter
2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam
ISBN
9780521108744

The Dynamics of Norms

Häftad,  Engelska, 2009-04-09
436
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In the social sciences norms are sometimes taken to play a key explanatory role. Yet norms differ from group to group, from society to society, and from species to species. How are norms formed and how do they change? This 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays presents some of the best contemporary research into the dynamic processes underlying the formation, maintenance, metamorphosis and dissolution of norms. The volume combines formal modelling with more traditional analysis, and considers biological and cultural evolution, individual learning, and rational deliberation. In filling a significant gap in the current literature this volume will be of particular interest to economists, political scientists and sociologists, in addition to philosophers of the social sciences.
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1. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma Robert Axelrod; 2. Learning to co-operate Cristina Bicchieri; 3. On the dynamics of social norms Pier Luigi Sacco; 4. Learning and efficiency in common interest signalling games David Canning; 5. Learning on a Torus Luca Anderlini and Antonella Ianni; 6. Evolutive vs. naive Bayesian learning Immanuel M. Bomze and Jurgen Eichberger; 7. Learning and mixed strategy equilibria in evolutionary games Vincent P. Crawford; 8. Bayesian learning in games: a non-Bayesian perspective J. S. Jordan; 9. Savage-Bayesian agents play a repeated game Yaw Nyarko; 10. Chaos and the explanatory significance of equilibrium: strange attractors in evolutionary game theory Brian Skyrms.