Industrial Organization

Dr John Lipczynski is retired from the University sector. He contributes to the teaching and development of Executive MBA programmes in the private sector. Professor John O.S. Wilson is Professor of Banking & Finance and Director of Research in the Management School at the University of St Andrews. He is Director for the Centre for Responsible Banking & Finance. His research interests include industrial organization and banking. Professor John Goddard is Professor of Financial Economics and Deputy Head of Bangor Business School at Bangor University. His research interests include industrial organization, banking and the economics of professional football.

Contents

Preface

Acknowledgements

Part I:  Theoretical Foundations

1 Industrial organization: an introduction

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Static and dynamic views of competition

1.3 The structureconductperformance paradigm

1.4 Strategic management: a short diversion

Discussion questions

Further reading

2 Production, costs, demand and profit maximization

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Production and costs

2.3 Demand, revenue, elasticity and profit maximization

2.4 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

3 The neoclassical theory of the firm

3.1 Introduction

3.2 The neoclassical theory of the firm: historical development

3.3 Theories of perfect competition and monopoly

3.4 Efficiency and welfare properties of perfect competition and monopoly

3.5 Theory of monopolistic competition

3.6 Summary

Discussion questions

4 Managerial and behavioural theories of the firm

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Critique of the neoclassical theory of the firm

4.3 Separation of ownership from control: managerial theories of the firm

4.4 The behavioural theory of the firm

4.5 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

5 Transaction costs, agency and resource-based theories of the firm

5.1 Introduction

5.2 The Coasian firm

5.3 Transaction costs and the theory of the firm

5.4 Agency theory

5.5 Property rights and the theory of the firm

5.6 The resource-based theory of the firm

5.7 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

6. Corporate governance

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Agency problems and the need for corporate governance

6.3 Instruments of corporate governance

6.4 Corporate governance codes of practice

6.5 Corporate governance: implementation and empirical evidence

6.6 Business ethics

6.7 Corporate social responsibility

6.8 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

Part II:  Structural Analysis of Industry

7 Oligopoly: non-collusive models

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Interdependence, conjectural variation, independent action and collusion

7.3 Models of output determination in duopoly

7.4 Models of price determination in duopoly

7.5 The kinked demand curve and models of price leadership

7.6 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

8 Oligopoly: collusive models

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Collusive action and collusive forms

8.3 Collusive institutions

8.4 Profit-maximizing models of price and output determination for a cartel

8.5 Other motives for collusion

8.6 Factors conducive to cartel formation

8.7 Influences on cartel stability

8.8 Summary

Discussion questions

Further reading

9 Game Theory

9....