A Guide
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Köp båda 2 för 579 krThe author fosters an excellent bridge to the primary sources and presents the material in a way that scarcely could be made more palatable. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above. (Choice, 1 December 2014)
John Turri is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Canada. He specializes in epistemology, philosophy of language, experimental philosophy, and cognitive science. He is editor of Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa (2013) and coeditor of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd edition, Wiley Blackwell, 2013) and Virtue Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (2012).
Preface xi Acknowledgments xiii 1 The best case for skepticism about the external world? (Stroud, The Problem of the External World) 1 2 Proving the external world exists (Or: Lets all give Moore a hand!) (Moore, Proof of an External World) 6 3 Some ways of resisting skepticism (Moore, Four Forms of Scepticism) 10 4 Plausibility and possibilities (Moore, Certainty) 15 5 Skeptic on skeptic (Klein, How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism) 19 6 Realism in epistemology (Williams, Epistemological Realism) 24 7 Socratic questions and the foundation of empirical knowledge (Chisholm, The Myth of the Given) 31 89 The foundation of empirical knowledge? (Sellars, Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? and Epistemic Principles) 36 10 Its not a given that empirical knowledge has a foundation (BonJour, Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?) 44 11 Interpretation, meaning and skepticism (Davidson, A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge) 49 12 Blending foundationalism and coherentism (Haack, A Foundherentist Theory of Epistemic Justification) 54 13 Foundationalism, coherentism and supervenience (Sosa, The Raft and the Pyramid) 60 14 Infinitism (Klein, Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons) 67 15 The Gettier problem (Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?) 73 16 Some principles concerning knowledge and inference (Harman, Thought, Selections) 77 17 The essence of the Gettier problem (Zagzebski, The Inescapability of Gettier Problems) 83 18 Knowledge is an unanalyzable mental state (Williamson, A State of Mind) 85 19 Closure, contrast and semi-skepticism (Dretske, Epistemic Operators) 92 20 Closure, contrast and anti-skepticism (Stine, Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure) 99 21 Keeping close track of knowledge (Nozick, Knowledge and Skepticism) 103 22 Moore wins (Sosa, How to Defeat Opposition to Moore) 111 23 The closure principle: dangers and defense (Vogel, Are There Counter examples to the Closure Principle?) 116 24 Evidentialist epistemology (Feldman and Conee, Evidentialism) 123 25 Non-defensive epistemology (Foley, Skepticism and Rationality) 129 26 Reliabilism about justification (Goldman, What Is Justified Belief?) 135 27 Reliabilism: a level assessment (Vogel, Reliabilism Leveled) 141 28 Against externalism (BonJour, Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge) 146 29 Against internalism (Goldman, Internalism Exposed) 151 30 A skeptical take on externalism (Fumerton, Externalism and Skepticism) 156 31 A friendly take on internalism (Feldman and Conee, Internalism Defended) 159 32 Warrant (Plantinga, Warrant: A First Approximation) 164 33 Intellectual virtues (Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind) 169 34 Virtue epistemology (Greco, Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology) 172 35 Knowledge, luck and virtue (Pritchard, Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues) 176 36 Epistemic value and cognitive achievement (Sosa, The Place of Truth in Epistemology) 181 37 Giving up on knowledge (Kvanvig, Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?) 187 38 Giving up on (exact) truth (Elgin, True Enough) 192 39 Naturalized epistemology advertised (Quine, Epistemology Naturalized) 196 40 Naturalized epistemology criticized (Kim, What is Naturalized Epistemology?) 203 41 Naturalized epistemology radicalized (Antony, Quine as Feminist) 207 42 A apriori justification and unrevisability (Putnam, There is at Least One A Priori Truth) 211 43 A priori justification and revisability (Casullo, Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge) 215 44 Philosophical method and empirical science (Bealer,