The Economics of Philanthropy and Fundraising (inbunden)
Format
Inbunden (Hardback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
1352
Utgivningsdatum
2015-07-30
Förlag
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Dimensioner
241 x 171 x 76 mm
Vikt
2540 g
ISBN
9781782546054
The Economics of Philanthropy and Fundraising (inbunden)

The Economics of Philanthropy and Fundraising

Inbunden Engelska, 2015-07-30
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What are people buying when they give money away? Is pure altruism possible? Who benefits from grants to charities and subsidies to givers? Is religious giving different? Which fundraising approaches `work', and is more charity always better? Questions like these make philanthropy and fundraising among the most dynamic research areas in economics today. Including an original introduction, this two-volume collection guides both students and scholars from the time when giving was seen as `irrational', to the present when economics has fully embraced the complex and fascinating challenges of understanding why self-interested people can be so unselfish.
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Edited by James Andreoni, Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, US

Innehållsförteckning

Contents: Volume I Acknowledgements Introduction James Andreoni PART I IS ALTRUISTIC GIVING A VALID TOPIC FOR ECONOMICS? 1. Kenneth E. Boulding (1962), `Notes on a Theory of Philanthropy', in Frank G. Dickinson (ed.), Philanthropy and Public Policy, New York, NY: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 57-71 2. Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers (1969), `Pareto Optimal Redistribution', American Economic Review, 59 (4), September, 542-57 3. Gary S. Becker (1974), `A Theory of Social Interactions', Journal of Political Economy, 82 (6), November/December, 1063-93 4. Kenneth J. Arrow (1981), `Optimal and Voluntary Income Distribution', in Steven Rosefielde (ed.), Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson, Chapter 10, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 267-88 PART II CROWDING-OUT AND NEUTRALITY 5. Peter G. Warr (1983), `The Private Provision of a Public Good is Independent of the Distribution of Income', Economic Letters, 13 (2-3), 207-11 6. Russell D. Roberts (1984), `A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers', Journal of Political Economy, 92 (1), February, 136-48 PART III NEUTRALITY AND ITS LIMITS 7. Theodore Bergstrom, Lawrence Blume and Hal Varian (1986), `On the Private Provision of Public Goods', Journal of Public Economics, 29 (1), February, 25-49 8. James Andreoni (1988), `Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism', Journal of Public Economics, 35 (1), February, 57-73 9. B. Douglas Bernheim (1986), `On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods', American Economic Review, 76 (4), September, 789-93 10. James Andreoni and Ted Bergstrom (1996), `Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods?', Public Choice, 88 (3/4), September, 295-308 PART IV GENERALIZING ALTRUISM: WARM-GLOW GIVING 11. Robert Sugden (1984), `Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary Contributions', Economic Journal, 94 (376), December, 772-87 12. Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler (1984), `Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods', Economic Journal, 94 (375), September, 580-98 13. James Andreoni (1989), `Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence', Journal of Political Economy, 97 (6), December, 1447-58 14. James Andreoni (1990), `Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving', Economic Journal, 100 (401), June, 464-77 15. William T. Harbaugh (1998), `What Do Donations Buy?: A Model of Philanthropy Based on Prestige and Warm Glow', Journal of Public Economics, 67 (2), February, 269-84 16. David C. Ribar and Mark O. Wilhelm (2002), `Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior', Journal of Political Economy, 110 (2), April, 425-57 PART V TESTING THEORIES OF PREFERENCES 17. James Andreoni (1993), `An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis', American Economic Review, 83 (5), December, 1317-27 18. Gary E. Bolton and Elena Katok (1998), `An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficent Behavior', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37 (3), November, 315-31 19. James Andreoni (1995), `Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness of Confusion?', American Economic Review, 85 (4), September, 891-904 20. James Andreoni and John Miller (2002), `Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism', Econometrica, 70 (2), March, 737-53 21. James Andreoni and Lise Vesterlund (2001), `Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (1), February, 293-312 22. Ulrich Mayr, William T. Harbaugh and Dharol Tankersley (2008), `Neuroeconomics of Charitable Giving and Philanthropy', in Paul W. Glimcher, Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr and Russell A. Poldrack (eds), Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain, Chapter 20