The Economics of Reputation (inbunden)
Format
Inbunden (Hardback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
736
Utgivningsdatum
2017-02-24
Förlag
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Dimensioner
247 x 171 x 44 mm
Vikt
1315 g
ISBN
9781785362507

The Economics of Reputation

Inbunden,  Engelska, 2017-02-24
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This research collection compiles key articles on the economics of reputation, starting from the origins of the ideas of asymmetric quality information and reputation, and going through to current articles, including the economics of collective reputation with implications for international trade. This is an ideal research resource for a graduate course in industrial organization or for the economist with interest in reputation issues. It is a useful reference for any economist's collection. 36 articles, dating from 1970 to 2015 Contributors include: G.A. Akerlof, F. Allen, B. Klein, D.M. Kreps, K.B. Leffler, H.E. Leland, P. Nelson, W.P. Rogerson, C. Shapiro, S. Tadelis, J.A. Tirole, R. Wilson
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Edited by Jill J. McCluskey, SES Distinguished Professor, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University and Jason Winfree, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Idaho, US

Innehållsförteckning

Contents: Acknowledgements Introduction Jill J. McCluskey and Jason Winfree 1. George A. Akerlof (1970), The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), August, 488500 2. Franklin Allen (1984), Reputation and Product Quality, RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (3), Autumn, 31127 3. Heski Bar-Isaac (2007), Something to Prove: Reputation in Teams, RAND Journal of Economics, 38 (2), Summer, 495511 4. Simon Board and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013), Reputation for Quality, Econometrica, 81 (6), November, 2381462 5. Iris Bohnet and Steffen Huck (2004), Repetition and Reputation: Implications for Trust and Trustworthiness When Institutions Change, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 94 (2), May, 36266 6. Gary E. Bolton, Elena Katok and Axel Ockenfels (2005), Cooperation among Strangers with Limited Information about Reputation, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (8), August, 145768 7. Lus M.B. Cabral (2000), Stretching Firm and Brand Reputation, RAND Journal of Economics, 31 (4), Winter, 65873 8. Stefano Castriota and Marco Delmastro (2015), The Economics of Collective Reputation: Evidence from the Wine Industry, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 97 (2), March, 46989 9. Shih-Chen Chiang and Robert T. Masson (1988), Domestic Industrial Structure and Export Quality, International Economic Review, 29 (2), May, 26170 10. Marco Costanigro, Craig A. Bond and Jill J. McCluskey (2012), Reputation Leaders, Quality Laggards: Incentive Structure in Markets with Both Private and Collective Reputations, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63 (2), June, 24564 11. Marco Costanigro, Jill J. McCluskey and Christopher Goemans (2010), The Economics of Nested Names: Name Specificity, Reputations, and Price Premia, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 92 (5), October, 133950 12. James D. Dana, Jr. and Yuk-Fai Fong (2011), Product Quality, Reputation, and Market Structure, International Economic Review, 52 (4), November, 105976 13. Shabtai Donnenfeld and Wolfgang Mayer (1987), The Quality of Export Products and Optimal Trade Policy, International Economic Review, 28 (1), February, 15974 14. Dirk Engelmann and Urs Fischbacher (2009), Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game, Games and Economic Behavior, 67 (2), November, 399407 15. Rodney E. Falvey (1989), Trade, Quality Reputations and Commercial Policy, International Economic Review, 30 (3), August, 60722 16. Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (1989), Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player, Econometrica, 57 (4), July, 75978 17. Daniel Houser and John Wooders (2006), Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15 (2), Summer, 35369 18. Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, Journal of Political Economy, 89 (4), August, 61541 19. David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson (1982), Reputation and Imperfect Information, Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (2), August, 25379 20. Stuart Landon and Constance E. Smith (1998), Quality Expectations, Reputation, and Price, Southern Economic Journal, 64 (3), January, 62847 21. Hayne E. Leland (1979), Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, Journal of Political Economy, 87 (6), December, 132846 22. Jeffrey A. Livingston (2005), How Valuable Is a Good Reputation? A Sample Selection Model of Internet Auctions, Review of Economics and Statistics, 87 (3), August, 45365 23. W. Bentley MacLeod (2007), Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement, Journal of Economic Literature, XLV (3), September, 595