The Economic Theory of Incentives (inbunden)
Format
Inbunden (Hardback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
1880
Utgivningsdatum
2017-11-24
Förlag
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Dimensioner
247 x 177 x 127 mm
Vikt
3864 g
ISBN
9781785364433
The Economic Theory of Incentives (inbunden)

The Economic Theory of Incentives

Inbunden Engelska, 2017-11-24
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This comprehensive research review recaps major literary contributions to the economic theory of incentives. These carefully selected papers, both classic and contemporary, analyse collective decision problems in the context of asymmetric information, moral hazard and incomplete contracting. This review is an essential tool for any serious scholar and student in the field.
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Edited by David Martimort, Professor, Paris School of Economics and Research Director, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), France

Innehållsförteckning

Contents: Introduction David Martimort PART I COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION A. Public Goods and the Free Riding Problem 1. Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet (1979), 'Incentives and Incomplete Information', Journal of Public Economics, 11 (1), February, 25-45 2. Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1977), 'Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods', Econometrica, 45 (2), March, 427-38 3. Theodore Groves (1973), 'Incentives in Teams', Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 617-31 4. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1979), 'A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms', in Jean-Jacques Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences: Studies in Public Economics Volume 2, Part IV, Chapter 16, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, New York, NY, USA and Oxford, UK: North-Holland Publishing Company, 289-308 5. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1980), 'A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms', Econometrica, 48 (6), September, 1507-20 6. George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite (1990), 'Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents', Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 351-67 B. Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle 7. Allan Gibbard (1973), 'Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result', Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 587-601 8. Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin (1979), 'The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility', Review of Economic Studies, 46 (2), April, 185-216 9. Roger B. Myerson (1979), 'Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 47 (1), January, 61-73 10. Roger B. Myerson (1982), 'Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10 (1), June, 67-81 C. Full Implementation 11. Joel S. Demski and David Sappington (1984), 'Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents', Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June 152-71 12. Eric Maskin (1999), 'Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 23-38 13. Eric Maskin and John Moore (1999), 'Implementation and Renegotiation', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 39-56 14. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), 'Subgame Perfect Implementation', Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1191-1220 15. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1990), 'Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization', Econometrica, 58 (5), September, 1083-99 16. Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava (1989), 'Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies', Econometrica, 57 (1), January, 115-34 17. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1990), 'Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms', Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 453-75 D. Interim Efficiency 18. Bengt Holmstroem and Roger B. Myerson (1983), 'Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information', Econometrica, 51 (6), November, 1799-1819 19. John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999), 'A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods', Econometrica, 67 (2), March, 435-48 E. Auctions 20. Jacques Cremer and Richard P. McLean (1988), 'Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions', Econometrica, 56 (6), November, 1247-57 21. Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu (2001), 'Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations', Econometrica, 69 (5), September, 1237-59 22. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1989), 'Optimal Multi-unit Auctions', in Frank Hahn (ed.), The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, Chapter 14, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 312-35 23. Roger B. Myerson (1981), 'Optimal Auction Design', Mathematics of Operations Research, 6 (1), February, 58-73 24. John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981), 'Optima