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Köp båda 2 för 25594 krEdited by David Martimort, Professor, Paris School of Economics and Research Director, cole des Hautes tudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), France
Contents: Introduction David Martimort PART I COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION A. Public Goods and the Free Riding Problem 1. Claude dAspremont and Louis-Andr Grard-Varet (1979), Incentives and Incomplete Information, Journal of Public Economics, 11 (1), February, 2545 2. Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1977), Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods, Econometrica, 45 (2), March, 42738 3. Theodore Groves (1973), Incentives in Teams, Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 61731 4. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1979), A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms, in Jean-Jacques Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences: Studies in Public Economics Volume 2, Part IV, Chapter 16, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, New York, NY, USA and Oxford, UK: North-Holland Publishing Company, 289308 5. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1980), A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms, Econometrica, 48 (6), September, 150720 6. George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite (1990), Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 35167 B. Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle 7. Allan Gibbard (1973), Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 587601 8. Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin (1979), The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility, Review of Economic Studies, 46 (2), April, 185216 9. Roger B. Myerson (1979), Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, 47 (1), January, 6173 10. Roger B. Myerson (1982), Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10 (1), June, 6781 C. Full Implementation 11. Joel S. Demski and David Sappington (1984), Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents, Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June 15271 12. Eric Maskin (1999), Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 2338 13. Eric Maskin and John Moore (1999), Implementation and Renegotiation, Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 3956 14. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), Subgame Perfect Implementation, Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 11911220 15. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1990), Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization, Econometrica, 58 (5), September, 108399 16. Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava (1989), Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies, Econometrica, 57 (1), January, 11534 17. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1990), Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 45375 D. Interim Efficiency 18. Bengt Holmstrm and Roger B. Myerson (1983), Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information, Econometrica, 51 (6), November, 17991819 19. John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999), A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods, Econometrica, 67 (2), March, 43548 E. Auctions 20. Jacques Crmer and Richard P. McLean (1988), Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions, Econometrica, 56 (6), November, 124757 21. Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu (2001), Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations, Econometrica, 69 (5), September, 123759 22. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1989), Optimal Multi-unit Auctions, in Frank Hahn (ed.), The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, Chapter 14, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 31235 23. Roger B. Myerson (1981), Optim