Great Expectations, Slow Transformations

"The Global Financial Crisis was, by any measure, a great systemic shock that has so far led to a series of less-than-great systemic transformations - at least in the area of financial reform. Moschella and Tsingou explain why this is the case. By harnessing the insights of historical institutionalism to those of agent centered constructivism, they show us why great institutional transformations may take a lot longer, and are may be significantly more contingent, than we generally think." Mark Blyth Professor of International Political Economy Brown University "Many expected the financial collapse of 2007/8 to evoke significant reform of financial systems around the globe. So far, at least, national governments have been slow to act. Moschella and Tsingou's fascinating volume, Great Expectations, helps us understand why. In this thoughtful volume the editors have pulled together a series of well reasoned and persuasive essays examining the politics and political economy of financial reform efforts around the globe. Eschewing the temptation to blame specific interests and their compliant politicians, these authors give give us a set of nuanced stories that go beyond the politics of financial reform helping us better understand why institutional change itself is so difficult. This book will be of great interest both for political economists interested in the politics of banking and financial regulation in the early 21st century, as well as for Historical Institutionalists interested in the politics of institutional change." Sven Steinmo Professor and Chair in Political Economy and Public Policy European University Institute "In this timely, tightly argued, and empirically trenchant study, Moshella and Tsingou provide the strongest statement yet of why national and international post-crisis reform packages have fallen short of their most ambitious goals. Covering virtually every area of the international financial system, the editors and their collaborators detail the origins and consequences of incremental policy changes, but note that, in the end, reforms may produce a subtle transformation in financial market regulation. Great Expectations, Slow Transformations will long remain a major resource for scholars of post-crisis capitalism." Orfeo Fioretos Associate Professor Temple University

Manuela Moschella is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Turin. She is the author of Governing Risk: The IMF and Global Financial Crises published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2010. Her research interests include the politics of financial crises and processes of institutional change with a particular focus on the international financial institutions. She has published on these issues in a number of journals, including the Review of International Political Economy, New Political Economy, the Journal of Public Policy, Comparative European Politics and Comparative Economic Studies. She is currently co-editing the new Handbook of Global Economic Governance for Routledge. Eleni Tsingou is Assistant Professor of International Political Economy at the Copenhagen Business School and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Warwick. She is the author of numerous chapters and articles on the governance of global finance and her work has appeared in Review of International Political Economy, International Politics and International Political Sociology. She was also a member of the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform.

Contents List of Figures and Tables vii Contributors ix Acknowledgements xi Chapter One: Introduction: The Financial Crisis and the Politics of Reform: Explaining Incremental Change Manuela Moschella and Eleni Tsingou 1 Chapter Two: When New Ideas Meet Existing Institutions: Why Macroprudential Regulatory Change is a Gradual Process Andrew Baker 35 Chapter Three: Financial Services Governance in the European Union after the Global Financial Crisis: Incremental Changes or Path-Breaking Reform? Lucia Quaglia 57 Chapter Four: Global in Life, Still National in Death? Special Bank Resolution Regimes After the Crisis Martin B. Carstensen 77 Chapter Five: Offshore Financial Centres, Shadow Banking and Jurisdictional Competition: Incrementalism and Feeble Re-regulation Thomas Rixen 95 Chapter Six: The Wall-Street-Main-Street Nexus in Financial Regulation: Business Coalitions Inside and Outside the Financial Sector in the Regulation of OTC Derivatives Stefano Pagliari and Kevin Young 125 Chapter Seven: Continuity of Expert Rule: Global Accountancy Regulation After the Crisis Sebastian Botzem 149 Chapter Eight: Still in the Market for Change: The Mass Public as a Veto-Player in US and Danish Mortgage-Systems Reform Iver Kjar 173 Chapter Nine: Conclusions: Too Little, Too Slow? Manuela Moschella and Eleni Tsingou 193 Index 217