Conflict and Governance (inbunden)
Format
Inbunden (Hardback)
Språk
Engelska
Antal sidor
202
Utgivningsdatum
2003-03-01
Upplaga
2003 ed.
Förlag
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Medarbetare
Konrad, Kai A.
Illustrationer
5 Tables, black and white; VI, 202 p.
Dimensioner
241 x 165 x 12 mm
Vikt
430 g
Antal komponenter
1
Komponenter
1 Hardback
ISBN
9783540002208
Conflict and Governance (inbunden)

Conflict and Governance

Inbunden Engelska, 2003-03-01
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Conflict appears in many forms, from a dictator terrorizing his country to organized crime demanding protection money. Questions and issues addressed in this text include: the conditions which make conflict severe; whether voluntary agreements can avoid future conflict; how the outcome of one war will affect the incentives of countries to wage war in the future; and how dictators hold power. The book provides an overview of existing literature, applies the theory of conflict to new situations, and gives foundations for future work. It should interest both researchers and students studying political economy, public choice, international relations, and comparative politics.
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Innehållsförteckning

The wide importance of conflict.- Social identity, inequality and conflict.- Butter and guns: Complementarity between economic and military competition.- Targeting and political support for welfare spending.- How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist's view.- Tax resistance, economy and state transformation in China and Europe.- The rationality of revolution.- Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players.- Property rights and the evolution of the state.- The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not.- Social decision rules are not immune to conflict.