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Current Trends in Economics
Theory and Applications2519Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar.
Fri frakt inom Sverige för privatpersoner.In 1990, the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) was founded with the main purpose to advance our knowledge in theoretical economics and to facilitate communication among researchers in economics, mathematics, game theory and any other field which is po tentially useful to economic theory. To achieve these goals, SAET sponsors the research journal Economic Theory published by Springer-Verlag and holds international conferences every other year. The first two conferences SAET took place in the island of Cephalonia, Greece, in the summers of of 1993 and 1995. In the summer of 1997, the conference was held in Antalya, Turkey. The twenty-nine papers in this volume are mostly by participants in the Antalya meeting of SAET and form a broad sample of the 150 papers pre sented there. Topics covered include cooperative and noncooperative games, social choice and welfare, bargaining, matchings, auctions, mechanism de sign, general equilibrium, general equilibrium with finance, industrial or ganization, macroeconomics, and experimental economics. We have chosen to present the papers according to the alphabetical order of first author names instead of grouping them by topic or theme. We have appended a complete listing of the sessions in the conference together with a list of program committee members and of sponsors at the end of the volume.
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E. Agliardi: Pseudo-supermodular games: theory and an application.- F. Aleskerov, E. Kurbanov: Degree of manipulability of social choice procedures.- A. Alkan: On the properties of stable many-to-many matchings under responsive preferences.- S. Altug, F. Demers, M. Demers: Cost uncertainty, taxation, and irreversible investment.- S. Athanasoulis, R. Shiller: The significance of the market portfolio: theory and evidence.- E. Basci, I. Saglam: Does money matter? A deterministic model with cash-in-advance constraints in factor markets.- S. Bose, G. Deltas: Welcoming the middlemen: restricting competition in auctions by excluding the consumers.- M. Dasgupta, R. Deb: Acyclicity of fuzzy preferences.- J. Davila: On the connection between correlated equilibria and sunspot equilibria.- F. Forges: Ex post individually rational trading mechanisms.- H. Gersbach, H. Haller: Allocation among multi-member households: issues, cores, and equilibria.- P. Hammond, A. Villar: Valuation equilibrium revisited.- C. Herrero, A. Villar: The equal-distance rule in allocation problems with single-peaked preferences.- A. Idzik: The existence of the satisfactory point.- K. Kawamata: Optimal entry and the marginal contribution of a player.- L. Koutsougeras: On an Edgeworth characterization of rational expectations equilibria in atomless asset market economies.- S. Lahiri: A characterization of the equal income market equilibrium choice correspondence based on average envy freeness.- B. Lucke: Non-keynesian effects of fiscal contractions: theory and applications for Germany.- M. Magill, M. Quinzii: Incentives and risk sharing in a stock market equilibrium.- M.-A. Oliva, L. A. Rivera-Batiz: Mergers and acquisations, bargaining, and synergy traps.- B. Z. Orbay: Protectionism versus non-protectionism under cost uncertainty in Cournot and Stackelberg markets.- B. Peleg, J. Rosenmuller, P. Sudhoelter: The canonical extensive form of a game form: symmetries.- C. Ponsati, J. Sakovics: Bargaining in a changing environment.- D. Ramachandran, L. Ruschendorf: An extension of the nonatomic assignment model.- C. Seidl, S. Traub: Testing decision rules for multiattribute decision making.- K. Serfes, N. C. Yannelis: Collusion and distribution of profits under differential information.- A. Stefanescu: Predicting proposal configurations in cooperative games and exchange economies.- B. Taub: International financial equilibrium with risk sharing and private information.- R. Tourky: Remark on extended price equilibria.