The Strategy of Conflict (häftad)
Häftad (Paperback)
Antal sidor
New e.
Harvard University Press
36 line illustrations
36 line illustrations
220 x 140 x 18 mm
378 g
Antal komponenter
The Strategy of Conflict (häftad)

The Strategy of Conflict

(2 röster)
Häftad, Engelska, 1990-07-01
Skickas inom 2-5 vardagar.
Fri frakt inom Sverige för privatpersoner.
Finns även som
Visa alla 2 format & utgåvor
Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.
Visa hela texten

Passar bra ihop

  1. The Strategy of Conflict
  2. +
  3. Arms and Influence

De som köpt den här boken har ofta också köpt av Thomas C Schelling (häftad).

Köp båda 2 för 527 kr


Har du läst boken? Sätt ditt betyg »

Recensioner i media

Against the backdrop of the nuclear arms race in the late 1950s, Thomas Schelling's book "The Strategy of Conflict" set forth his vision of game theory as a unifying framework for the social sciences. Schelling showed that a party can strengthen its position by overtly worsening its own options, that the capability to retaliate can be more useful than the ability to resist an attack, and that uncertain retaliation is more credible and more efficient than certain retaliation. These insights have proven to be of great relevance for conflict resolution and efforts to avoid war. Schelling's work prompted new developments in game theory and accelerated its use and application throughout the social sciences. Notably, his analysis of strategic commitments has explained a wide range of phenomena, from the competitive strategies of firms to the delegation of political decision power.

Bloggat om The Strategy of Conflict

Övrig information

Thomas C. Schelling is Distinguished University Professor, Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland and Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Harvard University. He is co-recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics.


I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy 1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy 2. An Essay on Bargaining 3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War II. A Reorientation of Game Theory 4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision 5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves 6. Game Theory and Experimental Research III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient 7. Randomization of Promises and Threats 8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust 9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack 10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament Appendices A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for "Noncooperative" Games Index