Constitutional Political Economy

Edited by Stefan Voigt, Director, Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg, Germany

'By bringing together, from a variety of diverse and broadly scattered sources, papers and chapters on constitutional political economy, Stefan Voigt has not only rendered a great service to scholars working on the subject, he has at the same time documented how the issues though varied are complementary. The collection also makes apparent how the treatment of constitutional problems has evolved; it is so wide-ranging that it is possible that some political economy students of constitutions may discover analytical dimensions of the subject that had hitherto escaped their attention. It will, no doubt, supply some with new topics for reflection and research. Voigt's introduction is masterful. Though all the papers and chapters have been published previously, the two volumes make a genuine contribution.'

• Contents:Volume I AcknowledgementsIntroduction Stefan VoigtPART ITHE IDEA OF A CONSTITUTION / JUSTIFYING THE CONSTITUTION / PHILOSOPHICAL BASES 1. James M. Buchanan (1990), ‘The Domain of Constitutional Economics’2. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), ‘A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions’3. Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin (1995), ‘Constitutional Political Economy: The Political Philosophy of Homo Economicus?’4. Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin (1995), ‘Economizing on Virtue’5. Viktor Vanberg and James M. Buchanan (1989), ‘Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice’6. Dennis C. Mueller (2001), ‘The Importance of Uncertainty in a Two-stage Theory of Constitutions’7. Richard A. Posner (1987), ‘The Constitution as an Economic Document’8. Knut Wicksell (1958), ‘A New Principle of Just Taxation’PART IICONCEPTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 9. James M. Buchanan (1959), ‘Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy’10. Russell Hardin (1989), ‘Why a Constitution?’11. Peter C. Ordeshook (1992), ‘Constitutional Stability’12. Barry R. Weingast (1993), ‘Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets’13. Stefan Voigt (1999), ‘Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions’PART IIICREATING AND AMENDING CONSTITUTIONS 14. Dennis C. Mueller (1991), ‘Constitutional Rights’15. Tim R. Sass (1992), ‘Constitutional Choice in Representative Democracies’16. Douglas D. Heckathorn and Steven M. Maser (1987), ‘Bargaining and Constitutional Contracts’17. Larry J. Merville and Dale K. Osborne (1990), ‘Constitutional Democracy and the Theory of Agency’18. Robert A. McGuire and Robert L. Ohsfeldt (1989), ‘Self-Interest, Agency Theory, and Political Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution’19. Donald J. Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard (1993), ‘Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process’20. Stefan Voigt (1999), ‘Bargaining for Constitutional Change – Toward an Economic Theory of Constitutional Change’Name IndexVolume II AcknowledgementsAn introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume IPART ION THE HORIZONTAL SEPARATION OF POWERS 1. Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin (1994), ‘A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers’2. Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini (1997), ‘Separation of Powers and Political Accountability’3. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1975), ‘The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective’4. Eli M. Salzberger (1993), ‘A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have An Independent Judiciary?’5. J. Mark Ramseyer (1994), ‘The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach’6. Robert D. Cooter and Tom Ginsburg (1996), ‘Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models’7. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), ‘The Bicameral Legislature’8. Gary J. Miller and Thomas H. Hammond (1989), ‘Stability and Efficiency in a Separation-of-Powers Constitutional System’9. Saul Levmore (1992), ‘Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?’PART IITHE ECONOMICS OF SECESSION AND OF FEDERALISM 10. Cass R. Sunstein (1991), ‘Constitutionalism and Secession’11. Yan Chen and Peter C. Ordeshook (1994), ‘Constitutional Secession Clauses’12. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’13. Roland Vaubel (1996), ‘Constitutional Safeguards Against Centralization in Federal States: An International Cross-Section Analysis’PART IIICONSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 14. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi (1993), ‘Political Regimes and Economic Growth’15. Jon Elster (1995), ‘The Impact of Constitutions on Economic Performance’16. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1995), ‘Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures’17. Jakob de Haan and Jan-Egburt Sturm (2000), ‘On the Relationship Between Economic Freedom and Economic Growth’18. Lars P. Feld and Marcel R. Savioz (1997), ‘Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation’Name Index