Abraham Ben-Zvi – författare

-- Barry Rubin, Johns Hopkins University

This book analyzes the concept of an international conference as referred to by the major parties involved to resolve at least one facet of the Arab-Israel predicament. The restrictive type of conference has proved to be effective in resolving or stabilizing certain elements of the conflict.

In an effort to resolve a facet of the Arab-Israel predicament, this book analyzes the concept of an international conference as referred to by the major parties involved in the dispute. It focuses on Lausanne Peace Conference and Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.

The aim of this book is to specifically, expose the conceptual origins of the American failure to deter Japan, to a higher level of understanding regarding the general limits of deterrence and of coercive diplomacy will be achieved.

The aim of this book is to specifically, expose the conceptual origins of the American failure to deter Japan, to a higher level of understanding regarding the general limits of deterrence and of coercive diplomacy will be achieved. It is similarly hoped that by underscoring the role which certain basic cognitive (and bureaucratic) processes played

This book demonstrates that the origins of the US-Israeli alliance lay in the former's concern over Egyptian influence in Jordan, contrasting with the widely-held view of the significance of the Six Day War.The American-Israeli Alliance will be of great interest to students of Middle East studies, history, and politics.

This book demonstrates that the origins of the US-Israeli alliance lay in the former's concern over Egyptian influence in Jordan, contrasting with the widely-held view of the significance of the Six Day War.The American-Israeli Alliance will be of great interest to students of Middle East studies, history, and politics.

This volume seeks to reconstruct the process by which the Kennedy administration decided to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles. It argues that both domestic considerations and political calculations were part of a highly complex decision made by members of Washington's high policy elite.

Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel seeks to reconstruct and elucidate the processes behind the decisions made by the Johnson Administration during the years 1965-68 to sell Israel M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawk planes and F-4 Phantom planes. This examination is based on a distinction between three factions which competed for influence within Washington's high-policy elite: the traditionalists (whose major representative was Secretary of State Dean Rusk); the pragmatists (whose most outspoken representative was Robert Komer of the National Security Council); and the domestically oriented policymakers (the central decision-maker who quintessentially exemplifies this category being President Johnson). This book is a sequel to John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms to Israel, which examined the first arms deal between the US and Israel.

The essays in this volume discuss and assess the philosophies and writings of Professor David Vital. They aim to develop his work within modern diplomacy, issues relating to modern Jewish history, and within the State of Israel and its conduct of foreign relations.

This volume seeks to reconstruct the process by which the Kennedy administration decided to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles. It argues that both domestic considerations and political calculations were part of a highly complex decision made by members of Washington's high policy elite.