Andrea Iacona – författare

What can epistemology tell us about love? Here two philosophers use their training in arguments and reasoning to uncover the role of ungrounded beliefs when we fall in love. This not a self-help book, it is a philosophy book. Free of advice, methods and strategies for being successful in love, it does not offer solutions for problems. What it gives us instead is a reading of love as it actually is. The authors illustrate the fallacies of love by drawing on personal experiences, literary characters and imaginary individuals. They provide examples of ungrounded beliefs in Aesop’s Fables, Cinderella and Don Giovanni amongst others, and illustrate love as an inexhaustible source of misperceptions, misunderstandings and misconceptions. By tackling those characteristic and all-too familiar ways in which ungrounded love beliefs arise, the book forces us to question why baseless beliefs are maintained and reinforced, showing us that many love beliefs are built on anything but logic.

What can epistemology tell us about love? Here two philosophers use their training in arguments and reasoning to uncover the role of ungrounded beliefs when we fall in love. This not a self-help book, it is a philosophy book. Free of advice, methods and strategies for being successful in love, it does not offer solutions for problems. What it gives us instead is a reading of love as it actually is. The authors illustrate the fallacies of love by drawing on personal experiences, literary characters and imaginary individuals. They provide examples of ungrounded beliefs in Aesop’s Fables, Cinderella and Don Giovanni amongst others, and illustrate love as an inexhaustible source of misperceptions, misunderstandings and misconceptions. By tackling those characteristic and all-too familiar ways in which ungrounded love beliefs arise, the book forces us to question why baseless beliefs are maintained and reinforced, showing us that many love beliefs are built on anything but logic.

This textbook is a logic manual which includes an elementary course and an advanced course. This textbook is of great use to undergraduate philosophy students, graduate philosophy students, logic teachers, undergraduates and graduates in mathematics, computer science or related fields in which logic is required.

This textbook is a logic manual which includes an elementary course and an advanced course. This textbook is of great use to undergraduate philosophy students, graduate philosophy students, logic teachers, undergraduates and graduates in mathematics, computer science or related fields in which logic is required.

This second edition improves upon the first by offering a more detailed treatment of key topics and by expanding the set of problems and exercises. In particular, four new features deserve mention. First, the book now includes a more thorough exposition of natural deduction, explaining how derivations can be represented as trees of formulas. Second, it provides a detailed explanation of the main proof methods, illustrated with examples. Third, it offers a separate exposition of the logic of identity. Fourth, it presents a fuller treatment of modal logic, including results on consistency, soundness, and completeness. Additional changes include new examples drawn from elementary mathematics, a refined notation, and a more functional subdivision of the material, which simplifies some proofs and enhances clarity and readability. Overall, the text preserves the style of the first edition, aiming to present core ideas clearly, concisely, and with minimal distractions.

Logical form has always been a prime concern for philosophers belonging to the analytic tradition. For at least one century, the study of logical form has been widely adopted as a method of investigation, relying on its capacity to reveal the structure of thoughts or the constitution of facts. This book focuses on the very idea of logical form, which is directly relevant to any principled reflection on that method. Its central thesis is that there is no such thing as a correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfill two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and to semantics. This thesis has a negative and a positive side. The negative side is that a deeply rooted presumption about logical form turns out to be overly optimistic: there is no unique notion of logical form that can play both roles. The positive side is that the distinction between two notions of logical form, once properly spelled out, sheds light on some fundamental issues concerning the relation between logic and language.

Its central thesis is that there is no such thing as a correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfill two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and to semantics.

Over the past few years, the tree model of time has been widely employed to deal with issues concerning the semantics of tensed discourse.