Bruce A. Elleman – författare

This book provides a comprehensive history of the modern Chinese navy from 1840 to the present. Beginning with a survey of naval developments in earlier imperial times, the book goes on to show how China has since the mid-19th century four times built or rebuilt its navy: after the Opium Wars, a navy which was sunk or captured by the Japanese in the war of 1894–1895; during the 1920s and 1930s, a navy again sunk or lost to Japan, in the war of 1937–1945; in the 1950s, a navy built with Soviet help, which stagnated following the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s; and finally the present navy which absorbed its predecessor, but with the most modern sections dating from the 1990s—a navy which continues to grow and prosper. The book also shows how the underlying strategic imperative for the Chinese navy has been the defense of China’s coasts and major rivers; how naval mutiny was a key factor in the overthrow of the Qing and the Nationalist regimes; and how successive Chinese governments, aware of the potent threat of naval mutiny, have restricted the growth, independence, and capabilities of the navy. Overall, the book provides—at a time when many people in the West view China and its navy as a threat—a rich, detailed, and realistic assessment of the true nature of the Chinese navy and the contemporary factors that affect its development.

This book provides a comprehensive history of the modern Chinese navy from 1840 to the present. Beginning with a survey of naval developments in earlier imperial times, the book goes on to show how China has since the mid-19th century four times built or rebuilt its navy: after the Opium Wars, a navy which was sunk or captured by the Japanese in the war of 1894–1895; during the 1920s and 1930s, a navy again sunk or lost to Japan, in the war of 1937–1945; in the 1950s, a navy built with Soviet help, which stagnated following the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s; and finally the present navy which absorbed its predecessor, but with the most modern sections dating from the 1990s—a navy which continues to grow and prosper. The book also shows how the underlying strategic imperative for the Chinese navy has been the defense of China’s coasts and major rivers; how naval mutiny was a key factor in the overthrow of the Qing and the Nationalist regimes; and how successive Chinese governments, aware of the potent threat of naval mutiny, have restricted the growth, independence, and capabilities of the navy. Overall, the book provides—at a time when many people in the West view China and its navy as a threat—a rich, detailed, and realistic assessment of the true nature of the Chinese navy and the contemporary factors that affect its development.

This book examines the origins of the US Navy’s 2007 Maritime Strategy, the formation of the US government’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy, and the most recent revisions to this strategy that focus more specifically on China. Besides examining the details of this strategy formulation, the book explores the internal and external repercussions on the US Navy of the Pivot to Asia. It discusses the “Fat Leonard” scandal, which involved bribery and corruption in contracts for the maintenance of the US fleets in the region, and considers the sharp decrease in training and readiness of the Pacific fleet to support the pivot, which in turn led to serious maritime collisions. It also assesses the impact of the pivot on other countries in the region, engaging in the debate as to whether the pivot was necessary in order to convince the countries of the region that the United States had not lost its staying power, or whether the pivot managed to make tensions in the Asia-Pacific worse even while allowing the strategic situation in the Middle East and Europe to worsen as a result of neglect.

This book examines the origins of the US Navy’s 2007 Maritime Strategy, the formation of the US government’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy, and the most recent revisions to this strategy that focus more specifically on China. Besides examining the details of this strategy formulation, the book explores the internal and external repercussions on the US Navy of the Pivot to Asia. It discusses the “Fat Leonard” scandal, which involved bribery and corruption in contracts for the maintenance of the US fleets in the region, and considers the sharp decrease in training and readiness of the Pacific fleet to support the pivot, which in turn led to serious maritime collisions. It also assesses the impact of the pivot on other countries in the region, engaging in the debate as to whether the pivot was necessary in order to convince the countries of the region that the United States had not lost its staying power, or whether the pivot managed to make tensions in the Asia-Pacific worse even while allowing the strategic situation in the Middle East and Europe to worsen as a result of neglect.

This book explores the question “Why is the US Navy in the South China Sea at all?” It traces the history of diplomatic, economic, and military tensions among the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, outlining the origins of the United States-Vietnam relationship during the immediate post-World War II period, the turmoil of the Vietnam War during which China supported North Vietnam against a US-backed South Vietnam, and the decision of the US government to open relations with China beginning in 1972. It shows how from 1945–1975, the US government used its relations with Vietnam to exert diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on China to open negotiations leading to full recognition and further discusses the surprising action of the US Navy in 1974 to allow the Chinese Navy to take the Paracel Islands by force, thereby denying control over these islands to a united Vietnam, closely allied with the Soviet Union, which was the common enemy of both China and the USA. Overall, the book demonstrates how the presence of the US Navy in the South China Sea is a crucial element in much wider, global US strategy.

This book explores the question “Why is the US Navy in the South China Sea at all?” It traces the history of diplomatic, economic, and military tensions among the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, outlining the origins of the United States-Vietnam relationship during the immediate post-World War II period, the turmoil of the Vietnam War during which China supported North Vietnam against a US-backed South Vietnam, and the decision of the US government to open relations with China beginning in 1972. It shows how from 1945–1975, the US government used its relations with Vietnam to exert diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on China to open negotiations leading to full recognition and further discusses the surprising action of the US Navy in 1974 to allow the Chinese Navy to take the Paracel Islands by force, thereby denying control over these islands to a united Vietnam, closely allied with the Soviet Union, which was the common enemy of both China and the USA. Overall, the book demonstrates how the presence of the US Navy in the South China Sea is a crucial element in much wider, global US strategy.

This book discusses the key role of the transfer of naval technology from the U.S. to China in building up the Chinese Navy during the Cold War.

Revealing how this process began in the late 1970s under the Carter Administration when Deng Xiaoping was newly in power, and how it accelerated under both the Reagan and Bush administrations, moving from the transfer of simple technology to entire naval systems the book highlights how the policy was successful in helping make China a serious threat to the Soviet Union, and how it thereby contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The book also demonstrates how this same policy also enabled China, now with the world’s largest navy, to become much more assertive in East Asia more widely, resulting in the U.S. reversing its technology transfer policy following the Tiananmen Square massacre and in China turning to Russia and other former Soviet countries including Ukraine for the supply of Soviet-era equipment.

Utilising disclosed and formerly secret documents this book will be a valuable resource to both students and scholars of international relations, security studies and naval studies, particularly in relation to Chinese-U.S.-USSR relations during the Cold War.

This book discusses the key role of the transfer of naval technology from the U.S. to China in building up the Chinese Navy during the Cold War.

Revealing how this process began in the late 1970s under the Carter Administration when Deng Xiaoping was newly in power, and how it accelerated under both the Reagan and Bush administrations, moving from the transfer of simple technology to entire naval systems the book highlights how the policy was successful in helping make China a serious threat to the Soviet Union, and how it thereby contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The book also demonstrates how this same policy also enabled China, now with the world’s largest navy, to become much more assertive in East Asia more widely, resulting in the U.S. reversing its technology transfer policy following the Tiananmen Square massacre and in China turning to Russia and other former Soviet countries including Ukraine for the supply of Soviet-era equipment.

Utilising disclosed and formerly secret documents this book will be a valuable resource to both students and scholars of international relations, security studies and naval studies, particularly in relation to Chinese-U.S.-USSR relations during the Cold War.

Why did the Chinese empire collapse and why did it take so long for a new government to reunite China? Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 seeks to answer these questions by exploring the most important domestic and international conflicts over the past two hundred years, from the last half of the Qing empire through to modern day China. It reveals how most of China''s wars during this period were fought to preserve unity in China, and examines their distinctly cyclical pattern of imperial decline, domestic chaos and finally the creation of a new unifying dynasty.By 1989 this cycle appeared complete, but the author asks how long this government will be able to hold power. Exposing China as an imperialist country, and one which has often manipulated western powers in its favour, Bruce Elleman seeks to redress the views of China as a victimised nation.

Why did the Chinese empire collapse and why did it take so long for a new government to reunite China? Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 seeks to answer these questions by exploring the most important domestic and international conflicts over the past two hundred years, from the last half of the Qing empire through to modern day China. It reveals how most of China''s wars during this period were fought to preserve unity in China, and examines their distinctly cyclical pattern of imperial decline, domestic chaos and finally the creation of a new unifying dynasty.By 1989 this cycle appeared complete, but the author asks how long this government will be able to hold power. Exposing China as an imperialist country, and one which has often manipulated western powers in its favour, Bruce Elleman seeks to redress the views of China as a victimised nation.

This book examines the nature and character of naval expeditionary warfare, in particular in peripheral campaigns, and the contribution of such campaigns to the achievement of strategic victory.

Naval powers, which can lack the massive ground forces to win in the main theatre, often choose a secondary theatre accessible to them by sea and difficult for their enemies to reach by land, giving the sea power and its expeditionary forces the advantage. The technical term for these theatres is ‘peripheral operations.’ The subject of peripheral campaigns in naval expeditionary warfare is central to the British, the US, and the Australian way of war in the past and in the future. All three are reluctant to engage large land forces because of the high human and economic costs. Instead, they rely as much as possible on sea and air power, and the latter is most often in the form of carrier-based aviation. In order to exert pressure on their enemies, they have often opened additional theaters in on-going, regional, and civil wars.

This book contains thirteen case studies by some of the foremost naval historians from the United States, Great Britain, and Australia whose collected case studies examine the most important peripheral operations of the last two centuries.

This book will be of much interest to students of naval warfare, military history, strategic studies and security studies.

This book examines the nature and character of naval expeditionary warfare, in particular in peripheral campaigns, and the contribution of such campaigns to the achievement of strategic victory.

Naval powers, which can lack the massive ground forces to win in the main theatre, often choose a secondary theatre accessible to them by sea and difficult for their enemies to reach by land, giving the sea power and its expeditionary forces the advantage. The technical term for these theatres is ‘peripheral operations.’ The subject of peripheral campaigns in naval expeditionary warfare is central to the British, the US, and the Australian way of war in the past and in the future. All three are reluctant to engage large land forces because of the high human and economic costs. Instead, they rely as much as possible on sea and air power, and the latter is most often in the form of carrier-based aviation. In order to exert pressure on their enemies, they have often opened additional theaters in on-going, regional, and civil wars.

This book contains thirteen case studies by some of the foremost naval historians from the United States, Great Britain, and Australia whose collected case studies examine the most important peripheral operations of the last two centuries.

This book will be of much interest to students of naval warfare, military history, strategic studies and security studies.