Butterfield – författare

These nine essays, commissioned on the initiative of the Philosophy section of the British Academy, address fundamental questions about time in philosophy, physics, linguistics, and psychology. Are there facts about the future? Could we affect the past? In physics, general relativity and quantum theory give contradictory treatments of time. So in the current search for a theory of quantum gravity, which should give way: general relativity or quantum theory? In linguistics and psychology, how does our language represent time, and how do our minds keep track of it?

''Interesting with many useful ideas and references. It covers a broad range and it is a good introduction to this field.'' ---Analyst

Changes in assessment are at the heart of government policy for change in the UK. The GCSE, the National Curriculum and National Vocational Qualifications seek to make the progress of individuals more measurable - in order to make education professionals more accountable. These changes create a precarious balance - between the promise of better opportunity for students and a system of centralized control which could be stifling for teachers and learners alike.This book takes an overall view of the technical claims made for improvements in assessment, alongside the policy agenda within which the changes are introduced. It highlights the dangers of taking a fragmented view - and allowing a competitive system and league tables to be based on information which may be technically shaky.The alternative to mechanistic, objectives-driven models of control appear to be a reassertion of the professional role in education. However, arguments for professional power have to be carefully weighed against the need for learner empowerment.

This is a collection of eleven original essays in analytical philosophy by British and American philosophers, centring on the connection between mind and language. Two themes predominate: how it is that thoughts and sentences can represent the world; and what having a thought - a belief, for instance - involves. Developing from these themes are the questions: what does having a belief require of the believer, and of the way he or she relates to the environment? In particular, does having a belief require speaking a language? The volume concludes the informal series stemming from the meetings sponsored by the Thyssen Foundation. It will interest analytical philosophers, students doing courses in philosophy of mind within the analytical tradition and philosophically interested researchers in cognitive psychology.