C. P. Ragland – författare

Offering an original perspective on the central project of Descartes'' Meditations, this book argues that Descartes'' free will theodicy is crucial to his refutation of skepticism.A common thread runs through Descartes'' radical First Meditation doubts, his Fourth Meditation discussion of error, and his pious reconciliation of providence and freedom: each involves a clash of perspectives-thinking of God seems to force conclusions diametrically opposed to those we reach when thinking only of ourselves. Descartes fears that a skeptic could exploit this clash of perspectives to argue that Reason is not trustworthy because self-contradictory. To refute the skeptic and vindicate the consistency of Reason, it is not enough for Descartes to demonstrate (in the Third Meditation) that our Creator is perfect; he must also show (in the Fourth) that our errors cannot prove God''s imperfection. To do this, Descartes invokes the idea that we err freely. However, prospects initially seem dim for this free will theodicy, because Descartes appears to lack any consistent or coherent understanding of human freedom.In an extremely in-depth analysis spanning four chapters, Ragland argues that despite initial appearances, Descartes consistently offered a coherent understanding of human freedom: for Descartes, freedom is most fundamentally the ability to do the right thing. Since we often do wrong, actual humans must therefore be able to do otherwise-our actions cannot be causally determined by God or our psychology. But freedom is in principle compatible with determinism: while leaving us free, God could have determined us to always do the good (or believe the true). Though this conception of freedom is both consistent and suitable to Descartes'' purposes, when he attempts to reconcile it with divine providence, Descartes''s strategy fails, running afoul of his infamous doctrine that God created the eternal truths.

Offering an original perspective on the central project of Descartes'' Meditations, this book argues that Descartes'' free will theodicy is crucial to his refutation of skepticism.A common thread runs through Descartes'' radical First Meditation doubts, his Fourth Meditation discussion of error, and his pious reconciliation of providence and freedom: each involves a clash of perspectives-thinking of God seems to force conclusions diametrically opposed to those we reach when thinking only of ourselves. Descartes fears that a skeptic could exploit this clash of perspectives to argue that Reason is not trustworthy because self-contradictory. To refute the skeptic and vindicate the consistency of Reason, it is not enough for Descartes to demonstrate (in the Third Meditation) that our Creator is perfect; he must also show (in the Fourth) that our errors cannot prove God''s imperfection. To do this, Descartes invokes the idea that we err freely. However, prospects initially seem dim for this free will theodicy, because Descartes appears to lack any consistent or coherent understanding of human freedom.In an extremely in-depth analysis spanning four chapters, Ragland argues that despite initial appearances, Descartes consistently offered a coherent understanding of human freedom: for Descartes, freedom is most fundamentally the ability to do the right thing. Since we often do wrong, actual humans must therefore be able to do otherwise-our actions cannot be causally determined by God or our psychology. But freedom is in principle compatible with determinism: while leaving us free, God could have determined us to always do the good (or believe the true). Though this conception of freedom is both consistent and suitable to Descartes'' purposes, when he attempts to reconcile it with divine providence, Descartes''s strategy fails, running afoul of his infamous doctrine that God created the eternal truths.

In this stimulating book, six leading philosophers—Karl-Otto Apel, Robert Brandom, Karsten Harries, Martha Nussbaum, Barry Stroud, and Allen Wood—consider the nature of philosophy. Although each of them has a unique perspective, they all seem to agree that philosophy seeks to uncover hidden assumptions and concepts in order to expose them to critical scrutiny. It is thus entirely fitting that philosophers should examine their own assumptions about the nature of their discipline.As they delve into the nature of philosophy, the authors address many fascinating subjects: what makes philosophy different from natural science, religion, and other branches of the humanities; whether philosophy can contribute to political transformation, and if so, how; whether there can ever be an “end of philosophy”; and more. The editors’ introduction ties together the contributors’ diverse perspectives by noting common themes, similarities, and differences.

This Element discusses the roles played by the idea of God in René Descartes' epistemology, physics, and metaphysics, and problems arising from those roles. Section 1 gives an overview of Descartes' life, works, and reception, focusing on the extent to which he is a religious or a secular thinker. Section 2 focuses on the problem of the Cartesian circle generated by his claim that all human knowledge depends on knowledge of God. Section 3 explains the role of God in Descartes' physics and addresses problems concerning how God's causal activity relates to that of creatures, including how divine providence fits with human freedom and how voluntary bodily actions are consistent with the laws of nature. Section 4 explores Descartes' claim that God freely created the eternal truths, noting its implications for his theory of modality.