Charlotte Gauvry – författare
1 407 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
1 733 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
This collection of fourteen original essays addresses the seminal contribution of Franz Brentano and his heirs, to philosophy of language. Despite the great interest provoked by the Brentanian tradition and its multiple connections with early analytic philosophy, precious little is known about the Brentanian contribution to philosophy of language. The aim of this new collection is to fill this gap by providing the reader with a more thorough understanding of the legacy of Brentano and his school, in their pursuit of a unique research programme according to which the analysis of meaning is inseparable from philosophical inquiries into what goes on in the mind and what there is in the world.
In three parts, the volume first reconstructs Brentano’s pathbreaking thoughts on meaning and grammatical illusions, exploring their strong connections with the Austro-German tradition and analytic philosophy. It then addresses the multifaceted debates on the objectivity of meaning in the Brentano School and its aftermath (Meinong, Husserl, Ingarden, Twardowski and the Lvov-Warsaw School). Finally, part three explores Brentano’s wider legacy, namely: Husserl’s theory of modification and typicality, Bühler’s theory of linguistic and non-linguistic expressions, and Wittgenstein’s thoughts on guidance and rule-following.
The result is a unique collection of essays which shows the significance, originality and timely character of the Brentanian philosophy of language.
1 407 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
488 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
La comparaison des positions de Martin Heidegger et Ludwig Wittgenstein suscite tout à la fois une grande réticence et un vif intérêt. Le présent ouvrage entreprend de mener une analyse critique de la tradition de comparaison inaugurée par le commentaire de Hubert Dreyfus de 1990, afin de clarifier à nouveaux frais les enjeux de l’herméneutique de la facticité heideggérienne et du contextualisme wittgensteinien. Il procède par une comparaison inédite entre la notion heideggérienne de «?monde ambiant?» [Umwelt] et les notions wittgensteiniennes de «?contexte?». Il creuse ainsi méthodiquement l’écart conceptuel entre la phénoménologie herméneutique et le contextualisme normatif, et précise la spécificité des régimes de détermination en jeu dans l’économie des deux corpus.