Christian Seidel – författare

Consequentialism is a focal point of discussion and a driving force behind important developments in moral philosophy. Recently, the debate has shifted in focus and in style. By seeking to consequentialize rival moral theories, in particular those with agent-relative characteristics, and by framing accounts in terms of reasons rather than in terms of value, an emerging new wave consequentialism has presented - at much higher levels of abstraction - theories which proved extremely flexible and powerful in meeting long-standing and influential objections. This volume of new essays on new wave consequentialism initiates and stimulates novel lines of discussions among proponents and their critics. The contributions explore new directions in new wave consequentialism and present refined conceptual frameworks (in Part I), raise challenging fundamental problems for these frameworks and the new wave's theoretical basis (in Part II), and give a balanced assessment of the new wave's limits and achievements in specific contexts of commonsense moral practice (in Part III). The volume will be of interest to all readers in ethical and moral theory.

Consequentialism is a focal point of discussion and a driving force behind important developments in moral philosophy. Recently, the debate has shifted in focus and in style. By seeking to consequentialize rival moral theories, in particular those with agent-relative characteristics, and by framing accounts in terms of reasons rather than in terms of value, an emerging new wave consequentialism has presented - at much higher levels of abstraction - theories which proved extremely flexible and powerful in meeting long-standing and influential objections. This volume of new essays on new wave consequentialism initiates and stimulates novel lines of discussions among proponents and their critics. The contributions explore new directions in new wave consequentialism and present refined conceptual frameworks (in Part I), raise challenging fundamental problems for these frameworks and the new wave''s theoretical basis (in Part II), and give a balanced assessment of the new wave''s limits and achievements in specific contexts of commonsense moral practice (in Part III). The volume will be of interest to all readers in ethical and moral theory.

Consequentialism is a focal point of discussion and a driving force behind important developments in moral philosophy. Recently, the debate has shifted in focus and in style. By seeking to consequentialize rival moral theories, in particular those with agent-relative characteristics, and by framing accounts in terms of reasons rather than in terms of value, an emerging new wave consequentialism has presented - at much higher levels of abstraction - theories which proved extremely flexible and powerful in meeting long-standing and influential objections. This volume of new essays on new wave consequentialism initiates and stimulates novel lines of discussions among proponents and their critics. The contributions explore new directions in new wave consequentialism and present refined conceptual frameworks (in Part I), raise challenging fundamental problems for these frameworks and the new wave''s theoretical basis (in Part II), and give a balanced assessment of the new wave''s limits and achievements in specific contexts of commonsense moral practice (in Part III). The volume will be of interest to all readers in ethical and moral theory.

The link between justice and climate change is becoming increasingly prominent in public debates on climate policy. This clear and concise philosophical introduction to climate justice addresses the hot topic of climate change as a moral challenge.Using engaging everyday examples the authors address the core arguments by providing a comprehensive and balanced overview of this heated debate, enabling students and practitioners to think critically about the subject area and to promote discussion on questions such as: Why do anything in the face of climate change?How much do we owe our descendants – a better world, or nothing at all?How should we distribute the burden of climate action between industrialized and developing countries?Should I adopt a green lifestyle even if no one else makes an effort?Which means of reducing emissions are permissible? Should we put hope in technological solutions?Should we re-design democratic institutions for more effective climate policy?With chapter summaries, illustrative examples and suggestions for further reading, this book is an ideal introduction for students in political philosophy, applied ethics and environmental ethics, as well as for practitioners working on one of the most urgent issues of our time.

The link between justice and climate change is becoming increasingly prominent in public debates on climate policy. This clear and concise philosophical introduction to climate justice addresses the hot topic of climate change as a moral challenge.Using engaging everyday examples the authors address the core arguments by providing a comprehensive and balanced overview of this heated debate, enabling students and practitioners to think critically about the subject area and to promote discussion on questions such as: Why do anything in the face of climate change?How much do we owe our descendants – a better world, or nothing at all?How should we distribute the burden of climate action between industrialized and developing countries?Should I adopt a green lifestyle even if no one else makes an effort?Which means of reducing emissions are permissible? Should we put hope in technological solutions?Should we re-design democratic institutions for more effective climate policy?With chapter summaries, illustrative examples and suggestions for further reading, this book is an ideal introduction for students in political philosophy, applied ethics and environmental ethics, as well as for practitioners working on one of the most urgent issues of our time.

The link between justice and climate change is becoming increasingly prominent in public debates on climate policy. This clear and concise philosophical introduction to climate justice addresses the hot topic of climate change as a moral challenge.

Using engaging everyday examples the authors address the core arguments by providing a comprehensive and balanced overview of this heated debate, enabling students and practitioners to think critically about the subject area and to promote discussion on questions such as:

Why do anything in the face of climate change? How much do we owe our descendants – a better world, or nothing at all? How should we distribute the burden of climate action between industrialized and developing countries? Should I adopt a green lifestyle even if no one else makes an effort? Which means of reducing emissions are permissible? Should we put hope in technological solutions? Should we re-design democratic institutions for more effective climate policy?

With chapter summaries, illustrative examples and suggestions for further reading, this book is an ideal introduction for students in political philosophy, applied ethics and environmental ethics, as well as for practitioners working on one of the most urgent issues of our time.

The link between justice and climate change is becoming increasingly prominent in public debates on climate policy. This clear and concise philosophical introduction to climate justice addresses the hot topic of climate change as a moral challenge.

Using engaging everyday examples the authors address the core arguments by providing a comprehensive and balanced overview of this heated debate, enabling students and practitioners to think critically about the subject area and to promote discussion on questions such as:

Why do anything in the face of climate change? How much do we owe our descendants – a better world, or nothing at all? How should we distribute the burden of climate action between industrialized and developing countries? Should I adopt a green lifestyle even if no one else makes an effort? Which means of reducing emissions are permissible? Should we put hope in technological solutions? Should we re-design democratic institutions for more effective climate policy?

With chapter summaries, illustrative examples and suggestions for further reading, this book is an ideal introduction for students in political philosophy, applied ethics and environmental ethics, as well as for practitioners working on one of the most urgent issues of our time.

The series of Ideen&Argumente subscribes to the ideal of a pluralist and open culture of argument and debate and presents well-produced volumes on topics and questions which make substantive or methodologically important contributions to contemporary philosophy. The publications are designed to effect a productive synergy between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European philosophical traditions. Ideen&Argumente provides a platform for outstanding systematically oriented original editions and German first editions from all areas of Theoretical and Practical Philosophy. A welcome is extended to programmatic monographs from whatever philosophical direction. The aim is to highlight anew the thematic and methodological richness of contemporary philosophy.

Was heißt es, als Person autonom zu sein? Diese Frage führt schnell in ein philosophisches Rätsel: Für Autonomie scheinen

ein bestimmtes Verhältnis der Person zu sich selbst, aber auch bestimmte Verhältnisse in der äußeren, die Person umgebenden Welt wesentlich zu sein; doch Selbst- und Weltverhältnisse unterscheiden sich so grundlegend, dass Autonomie nicht beides zugleich sein kann. Internalistische, externalistische und interaktionalistische Autonomiekonzeptionen versuchen, dieses Rätsel jeweils durch Ablehnung einer der Prämissen zu lösen. Wie sich jedoch zeigt, ist keiner dieser Ansätze zufriedenstellend.Dieses Buch entwickelt eine Lösung, die von der Einsicht ausgeht, dass Autonomie ein „dicker“ normativer Begriff ist, der für eine bestimmte Art praktischer Autorität steht. Dass eine Person autonom ist, ist demnach für andere stets ein Grund, Eingriffe in das Leben der Person zu unterlassen. Die Frage nach Bedingungen für Autonomie ist somit eine Frage nach Bedingungen für diesen Grund. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass Mündigkeit, Wehrhaftigkeit und Mitsprache diese Bedingungen sind – dass sich die Autonomie einer Person daran bemisst, was man von ihr an Regelung eigener Angelegenheiten, Gegenwehr gegen fremde Eingriffe und Mitsprache bei gemeinschaftlichen Angelegenheiten berechtigterweise erwarten darf. Und weil dafür Selbst- und Weltverhältnisse normativ relevant sind, besteht in der für den Autonomiebegriff konstitutiven – normativen – Hinsicht gerade kein Unterschied zwischen diesen. Das Rätsel personaler Autonomie ist somit gelöst.

Was heißt es, als Person autonom zu sein? Diese Frage führt schnell in ein philosophisches Rätsel: Für Autonomie scheinen

ein bestimmtes Verhältnis der Person zu sich selbst, aber auch bestimmte Verhältnisse in der äußeren, die Person umgebenden Welt wesentlich zu sein; doch Selbst- und Weltverhältnisse unterscheiden sich so grundlegend, dass Autonomie nicht beides zugleich sein kann. Internalistische, externalistische und interaktionalistische Autonomiekonzeptionen versuchen, dieses Rätsel jeweils durch Ablehnung einer der Prämissen zu lösen. Wie sich jedoch zeigt, ist keiner dieser Ansätze zufriedenstellend.Dieses Buch entwickelt eine Lösung, die von der Einsicht ausgeht, dass Autonomie ein „dicker“ normativer Begriff ist, der für eine bestimmte Art praktischer Autorität steht. Dass eine Person autonom ist, ist demnach für andere stets ein Grund, Eingriffe in das Leben der Person zu unterlassen. Die Frage nach Bedingungen für Autonomie ist somit eine Frage nach Bedingungen für diesen Grund. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass Mündigkeit, Wehrhaftigkeit und Mitsprache diese Bedingungen sind – dass sich die Autonomie einer Person daran bemisst, was man von ihr an Regelung eigener Angelegenheiten, Gegenwehr gegen fremde Eingriffe und Mitsprache bei gemeinschaftlichen Angelegenheiten berechtigterweise erwarten darf. Und weil dafür Selbst- und Weltverhältnisse normativ relevant sind, besteht in der für den Autonomiebegriff konstitutiven – normativen – Hinsicht gerade kein Unterschied zwischen diesen. Das Rätsel personaler Autonomie ist somit gelöst.

In Diskussionen wird heute, so heißt es, oft zu schnell und vehement die Moral-Keule geschwungen. Was steckt dahinter? Und ist das immer falsch?Christian Neuhäuser und Christian Seidel klären in ihrem Essay, welche guten und schlechten Seiten Moralismus hat. Sie plädieren für eine Haltung fortschrittsdienlicher moralischer Besonnenheit, die mit den Vor- und Nachteilen des Moralismus produktiv umzugehen lernt.