Christoph Bezemek - Böcker

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a ‘postnational constellation’ and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation?If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

Constitutionalism is in crisis. And the crisis unfolds not only on a national or a regional level. It is a global phenomenon: Democracy is no longer on the rise, the Rule of Law appears weakened, political cohesion seems to erode. Human Rights Protection finds itself questioned, International Criminal Law struggles for broad recognition, international trade may have lost some of its appeal. Institutional actors find their authority questioned, established political parties are threatened by ever-changing popular movements. But where to does the charted road lead? How will the “Crisis of Constitutionalism” unfold in the years to come? Nobody knows, of course. But at the same time: Nobody is too keen to make an educated guess either. This volume remedies that. By giving nine eminent scholars in law and political science the opportunity to make their predictions, where the constitutionalist project will stand ten years from now, it creates a forum of deliberation that will not only aim at anticipating the developments in question but at the same time shape academic discourse on constitutionalism alongside it.

Constitutionalism is in crisis. And the crisis unfolds not only on a national or a regional level. It is a global phenomenon: Democracy is no longer on the rise, the Rule of Law appears weakened, political cohesion seems to erode. Human Rights Protection finds itself questioned, International Criminal Law struggles for broad recognition, international trade may have lost some of its appeal. Institutional actors find their authority questioned, established political parties are threatened by ever-changing popular movements. But where to does the charted road lead? How will the “Crisis of Constitutionalism” unfold in the years to come? Nobody knows, of course. But at the same time: Nobody is too keen to make an educated guess either. This volume remedies that. By giving nine eminent scholars in law and political science the opportunity to make their predictions, where the constitutionalist project will stand ten years from now, it creates a forum of deliberation that will not only aim at anticipating the developments in question but at the same time shape academic discourse on constitutionalism alongside it.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a ‘postnational constellation’ and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation?If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it.This book considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves, on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates to the very concept of law.The book approaches these underlying problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.

The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it.This book considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves, on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates to the very concept of law.The book approaches these underlying problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.

In the fourth volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy, scholars in contemporary jurisprudence and constitutional theory discuss who gets to decide and who gets to act when constitutional law is silent or fundamentally controversial.It is the very purpose of Constitutions to settle disagreements: to determine who gets to decide and who gets to act when it comes to the polity and its members. But what if, instead of settling disagreements among those subjected to it, the Constitution itself, its end, its functions, its meaning, its existence, becomes the subject of disagreements? What if the Constitution raises issues it is unable to address from the very outset? Who gets to decide then and who gets to act?In a time in which constitutional crises seem to be too ubiquitous to still count as exceptions, questions such as these are asked with ever-increasing urgency. The answers to these questions cannot be found in arguments based on contingent legal stipulations but have to reach beyond the vague and fleeting instructions of positive law.

This book explores the interrelation of facts and norms. Today, Jellinek’s concept still provides astonishing insights on the dichotomy of “is” and “ought to be”, the emergence of the normative, the efficacy and the defeasibility of (legal) norms, and the distinct character of what legal theorists refer to as “normativity”.

This book explores the interrelation of facts and norms. Today, Jellinek’s concept still provides astonishing insights on the dichotomy of “is” and “ought to be”, the emergence of the normative, the efficacy and the defeasibility of (legal) norms, and the distinct character of what legal theorists refer to as “normativity”.

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the differences between common law and civil law systems from various theoretical perspectives.

This book offers an in-depth analysis of the differences between common law and civil law systems from various theoretical perspectives.

The volume is dedicated to the concept of sanctions and to the reassessment of its interrelation with the concept of law.

This book examines the success of Frederick Schauer’s efforts to reclaim force as a core element of a general concept of law by approaching the issue from different legal traditions and distinct perspectives. In discussing Schauer’s main arguments, it contributes to answering the question whether force, sanctions and coercion should (or should not) be regarded as necessary elements of the concept of law, and whether legal philosophy should be concerned at all (or exclusively) with necessary or essential properties.While it was long assumed that legal norms are essentially defined by their force, it was H.L.A. Hart who raised doubts about whether law and coercion are necessarily connected, referring to the empowering, or more generally enabling, character exhibited by some legal norms. Prominent scholars following and refining Hart’s argument built an influential case for excluding force as a necessary element of the concept of law. Most recently, however, Frederick Schauer has made a strong case to reaffirm the force of law, shedding new light on this essential question.  This book collects important commentaries, never before published, by prominent legal philosophers evaluating Schauer’s substantive arguments and his claims about jurisprudential methodology.

This book examines the success of Frederick Schauer’s efforts to reclaim force as a core element of a general concept of law by approaching the issue from different legal traditions and distinct perspectives.