Clive Jones – författare

Half a century ago, Britain abandoned Aden, its last colonial outpost in the Arab world as itsattempt to establish a new polity foundered amid a rising tide of Arab nationalism, tribalinfighting and anti-colonial sentiment that eventually gave rise to the establishment ofSouth Yemen. Yet just over three years later in 1971, a new state, the United Arab Emirates,emerged in Arabia, formed from the old Trucial states over which Britain had long heldsway. At a time when state failure and fragmentation has become synonymous with muchof the Middle East and where the very idea of sovereignty and legitimacy have becomecontested issues, this comparative historical study of the varied British attempts at statecreation on the Arabian peninsula offers important insights into the limits of external ambition,as well as the possibilities that great power retrenchment offered to the peoples of theregion. The legacy of British influence in Aden and Abu Dhabi still very much resonatestoday; this volume explains why.This book was originally published as a special issue of Middle Eastern Studies.

Often regarded as the only true manifestation of political pluralism in the contemporary Middle East, the state of Israel has dominated the history and politics of the region for over fifty years. Yet despite its position as a regional superpower, Israel continues to struggle with the whole issue of its own identity, the complexities of which have exposed deep clefts throughout Israeli society that threaten to undermine the collective ideal of a viable Jewish polity in the Middle East.The authors explore the complex challenges facing Israel, and the extent to which its present state structures and institutions can adapt and accommodate themselves to the diversity of security threats that it now faces. This book will be of interest to those who wish to understand the dynamics that have shaped and continue to shape the state of Israel, and the extent to which these have influenced its search for security in the modern Middle East.

Often regarded as the only true manifestation of political pluralism in the contemporary Middle East, the state of Israel has dominated the history and politics of the region for over fifty years. Yet despite its position as a regional superpower, Israel continues to struggle with the whole issue of its own identity, the complexities of which have exposed deep clefts throughout Israeli society that threaten to undermine the collective ideal of a viable Jewish polity in the Middle East.The authors explore the complex challenges facing Israel, and the extent to which its present state structures and institutions can adapt and accommodate themselves to the diversity of security threats that it now faces. This book will be of interest to those who wish to understand the dynamics that have shaped and continue to shape the state of Israel, and the extent to which these have influenced its search for security in the modern Middle East.

This volume seeks to explore whether the current violence, its origins and dynamics can best be understood as a manifestation of civil war. In so doing, it considers how the use of violence by all parties has been conditioned and/or constrained by the domestic factors pertaining to their societies, how external actors have dealt with the violence internally, and how this has impacted on their relations with Israel and the Palestinians, and what does the conduct and scope of the al-Aqsa Intifada suggest about the broader issue of state boundaries and state legitimacy in the contemporary Middle East?This volume was previously published as a special issue of the journal Civil Wars.

This volume seeks to explore whether the current violence, its origins and dynamics can best be understood as a manifestation of civil war. In so doing, it considers how the use of violence by all parties has been conditioned and/or constrained by the domestic factors pertaining to their societies, how external actors have dealt with the violence internally, and how this has impacted on their relations with Israel and the Palestinians, and what does the conduct and scope of the al-Aqsa Intifada suggest about the broader issue of state boundaries and state legitimacy in the contemporary Middle East?This volume was previously published as a special issue of the journal Civil Wars.

This book examines the local and international dynamics and strategies that have come to define the often violent relationship between Israel and Lebanon.Since the end of the Cold War, academic debate over the nature of war in the contemporary world has focused upon the asymmetric nature of conflict among a raft of failed or failing states, often held together by only a fragile notion of a shared communal destiny. Little scholarly attention has been paid, however, to one such conflict that predates the ending of the Cold War, yet still appears as intractable as ever: Israel’s hostile relationship with Lebanon and in particular, its standoff with the Lebanese Shi’a militia group, Hizbollah. As events surrounding the ‘Second Lebanon War’ in the summer of 2006 demonstrate, the clear potential for further cross border violence as well as the potential for a wider regional conflagration that embraces Damascus and Tehran remains as acute as ever.This book focuses on the historical background of the conflict, while also considering the role that other external actors, most notably Syria, Iran and the United Nations, play in influencing the conduct and outcomes of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. In addition, it also looks at Hizbollah’s increasing sway in Lebanese domestic politics, its increased military cooperation with Iran and Syria, and the implications of such developments. This book will be of much interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, War and Conflict Studies, International Security and International Relations in general. Clive Jones is Professor of Middle East Studies and International Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), University of Leeds, UK. His books include Soviet Jewish Aliyah 1989-92 (1996), Israel: Challenges to Democracy, Identity and the State (with Emma Murphy, 2002), and co-editor The al-Aqsa Intifada: Between Terrorism and Civil War (2005). Sergio Catignani is Lecturer in Security and Strategic Studies and MA Programme Director for the MA in Security and Strategic Studies at the Department of Politics, University of Sussex. He is the author of Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army (2008).

This book examines the local and international dynamics and strategies that have come to define the often violent relationship between Israel and Lebanon.Since the end of the Cold War, academic debate over the nature of war in the contemporary world has focused upon the asymmetric nature of conflict among a raft of failed or failing states, often held together by only a fragile notion of a shared communal destiny. Little scholarly attention has been paid, however, to one such conflict that predates the ending of the Cold War, yet still appears as intractable as ever: Israel’s hostile relationship with Lebanon and in particular, its standoff with the Lebanese Shi’a militia group, Hizbollah. As events surrounding the ‘Second Lebanon War’ in the summer of 2006 demonstrate, the clear potential for further cross border violence as well as the potential for a wider regional conflagration that embraces Damascus and Tehran remains as acute as ever.This book focuses on the historical background of the conflict, while also considering the role that other external actors, most notably Syria, Iran and the United Nations, play in influencing the conduct and outcomes of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. In addition, it also looks at Hizbollah’s increasing sway in Lebanese domestic politics, its increased military cooperation with Iran and Syria, and the implications of such developments. This book will be of much interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, War and Conflict Studies, International Security and International Relations in general. Clive Jones is Professor of Middle East Studies and International Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), University of Leeds, UK. His books include Soviet Jewish Aliyah 1989-92 (1996), Israel: Challenges to Democracy, Identity and the State (with Emma Murphy, 2002), and co-editor The al-Aqsa Intifada: Between Terrorism and Civil War (2005). Sergio Catignani is Lecturer in Security and Strategic Studies and MA Programme Director for the MA in Security and Strategic Studies at the Department of Politics, University of Sussex. He is the author of Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army (2008).

This volume examines the new, the changing, and the enduring features of international security in the post-Cold War era. In so doing, it examines the extent to which present state structures and institutions have been able to adapt and accommodate themselves to the diversity of security threats.

Half a century ago, Britain abandoned Aden, its last colonial outpost in the Arab world as itsattempt to establish a new polity foundered amid a rising tide of Arab nationalism, tribalinfighting and anti-colonial sentiment that eventually gave rise to the establishment ofSouth Yemen. Yet just over three years later in 1971, a new state, the United Arab Emirates,emerged in Arabia, formed from the old Trucial states over which Britain had long heldsway. At a time when state failure and fragmentation has become synonymous with muchof the Middle East and where the very idea of sovereignty and legitimacy have becomecontested issues, this comparative historical study of the varied British attempts at statecreation on the Arabian peninsula offers important insights into the limits of external ambition,as well as the possibilities that great power retrenchment offered to the peoples of theregion. The legacy of British influence in Aden and Abu Dhabi still very much resonatestoday; this volume explains why.This book was originally published as a special issue of Middle Eastern Studies.

Drawing on extensive interviews and archival research, this biography uncovers the motivations and ideals that informed Smiley’s commitment to covert action and intelligence during the Second World War and early part of the Cold War, often among tribally based societies. With particular reference to operations in Albania, Oman and Yemen, it addresses the wider issues of accountability and control of clandestine operations.

Drawing on extensive interviews and archival research, this biography uncovers the motivations and ideals that informed Smiley’s commitment to covert action and intelligence during the Second World War and early part of the Cold War, often among tribally based societies. With particular reference to operations in Albania, Oman and Yemen, it addresses the wider issues of accountability and control of clandestine operations.

Relations between Israel and the Gulf states are not anything new. In the immediate aftermath of the 1993 Oslo Accords, both Qatar and Oman established low-level yet open diplomatic ties with Israel. In 2010, Ha'aretz reported that the former Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, was on friendly terms with Shaykh Abdullah Ibn Zayed, her counterpart from the UAE, despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties between the two states. The shared suspicion towards the regional designs of Iran that undoubtedly underpinned these ties even extended, it was alleged, to a secret dialogue between Israel and Saudi Arabia, led by the late Meir Dagan, the former head of Mossad. Cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia in thwarting Iran's regional ambitions also casts light on Washington's lack of strategic leadership, which had previously been the totem around which Israel and the Gulf states had based regional security strategies. Jones and Guzansky contend that, at the very least, ties between Israel and many of its Gulf counterparts are now more vibrant than hitherto realised. They constitute a tacit security regime which, while based on hard power interests, does not preclude competition in other areas. Ultimately, these relations are helping shape a new regional order in the Middle East.

Between 1962 and 1965 Britain engaged in covert operations in support of Royalist forces fighting the Egyptian backed Republican regime that had seized power in the Yemeni capital Sana'a in September 1962. Covert action was regarded as a legitimate tool of foreign policy as Britain attempted to secure the future of the newly formed South Arabian Federation against the animus of Nasser. The use of covert action, as well as the quasi approval given to the use of mercenaries to support the Royalist cause, was the inevitable result of policy differences within Whitehall (most notably between the mandarins' of the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office) as well as international constraints imposed upon the UK in the aftermath of the Suez crisis. The book examines the extent to which British policy, while successful in imposing a war of attrition upon Nasser in the Yemen, contributed to the political demise of the very objective covert action was designed to secure: the future stability of the Federation of South Arabia. The study makes extensive use of primary sources in producing the first detailed account of British involvement in the Yemen Civil War, and how the experience shaped British foreign policy. It breaks new ground by analyzing the extent to which Britain came to support the Royalist cause despite public declarations of non-involvement in the Yemen conflict, and details for the first time how London's tacit support for mercenary operations' in the Yemen came to enlist the help of Saudi Arabia and Israel.

For over sixty years the state of Israel has proved adept at practising clandestine diplomacy - - about which little is known, as one might expect. These hitherto undisclosed episodes in Israel's diplomatic history are revealed for the first time by the contributors to this volume, who explore how relations based upon patronage and personal friendships, as well as ties born from kinship and realpolitik both informed the creation of the state and later defined Israel's relations with a host of actors, both state and non-state. The authors focus on the extent to which Israel's clandestine diplomacies have indeed been regarded as purely functional and sub- ordinate to a realist quest for security amid the perceived hostility of a predominantly Muslim-Arab world, or have in fact proved to be manifestations of a wider acceptance - political, social and cultural - of a Jewish sovereign state as an intrinsic part of the Middle East. They also discuss whether clandestine diplomacy has been more effective in securing Israeli objectives than reliance upon more formal diplomatic ties constrained by inter- national legal obligations and how this often complex and at times contradictory matrix of clandestine relationships continues to influence perceptions of Israel's foreign policy.

Between 1962 and 1965 Britain engaged in covert operations in support of Royalist forces fighting the Egyptian backed Republican regime that had seized power in the Yemeni capital Sana'a in September 1962. Covert action was regarded as a legitimate tool of foreign policy as Britain attempted to secure the future of the newly formed South Arabian Federation against the animus of Nasser. The use of covert action, as well as the quasi approval given to the use of mercenaries to support the Royalist cause, was the inevitable result of policy differences within Whitehall (most notably between the mandarins' of the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office) as well as international constraints imposed upon the UK in the aftermath of the Suez crisis. The book examines the extent to which British policy, while successful in imposing a war of attrition upon Nasser in the Yemen, contributed to the political demise of the very objective covert action was designed to secure: the future stability of the Federation of South Arabia. The study makes extensive use of primary sources in producing the first detailed account of British involvement in the Yemen Civil War, and how the experience shaped British foreign policy. It breaks new ground by analyzing the extent to which Britain came to support the Royalist cause despite public declarations of non-involvement in the Yemen conflict, and details for the first time how London's tacit support for mercenary operations' in the Yemen came to enlist the help of Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Britain's hasty departure from Aden and South Arabia after 138 years has often been presented as a humiliation at best and a disaster at worst. London's hopes of handing power and sovereignty over to a friendly federal regime collapsed in the face of a nationalist uprising backed that enjoyed the support of Egypt. Five decades after the final British troops left Aden, academic experts and former British officials directly involved in the events that unfolded critically reflect on British withdrawal from South Arabia, the post-colonial problems in South Yemen that still resonate today, and how the United Kingdom learnt from its experience in stabilising Oman while overseeing the formation of the United Arab Emirates.

This unique volume explores the role that Grand Strategy has played in the shaping of the Middle East and why, conceptually, its core principles still have traction in explaining the shifting alliances and dispensation of power across the region. When so much of the spatial as well as the geo-political boundaries of the Middle East are in flux, it is now time to revisit the very ideas that inform Grand Strategy that once again, are enjoying a wider intellectual renaissance in world affairs. Through a longitudinal method that embraces international history, regional security, and international relations, leading scholars from Europe, North America and the Middle East offer original and timely insights into how Grand Strategy has shaped not only Great Power involvement, but the designs of regional actors in their perennial search for security.