E. Haavi Morreim – författare

Health care in the US and elsewhere has been rocked by economic upheaval. Cost-cuts, care-cuts, and confusion abound. Traditional tort and contract law have not kept pace. Physicians are still expected to deliver the same standard of care -- including costly resources - to everyone, regardless whether it is paid for. Health plans can now face litigation for virtually any unfortunate outcome, even those stemming from society's mandate to keep costs down while improving population health. This book cuts through the chaos and offers a clear, persuasive resolution. Part I explains why new economic realities have rendered prevailing malpractice and contract law largely anachronistic. Part II argues that pointing the legal finger of blame blindly or hastily can hinder good medical care. Instead of "whom do we want to hold liable," we should focus first on "who should be doing what, for the best delivery of health care." When things go wrong, each should be liable only for those aspects of care they could and should have controlled. Once a good division of labor is identified, what kind of liability should be imposed depends on what kind of mistake was made. Failures to exercise adequate expertise (knowledge, skill, care effort) should be addressed as torts, while failures to provide promised resources should be resolved under contract. Part III shows that this approach, though novel, fits remarkably well with basic common law doctrines, and can even enlighten ERISA issues. With extensive documentation from current case law, commentary, and empirical literature, the book will also serve as a comprehensive reference for attorneys, law professors, physicians, administrators, bioethicists, and students.

Health care in the US and elsewhere has been rocked by economic upheaval. Cost-cuts, care-cuts, and confusion abound. Traditional tort and contract law have not kept pace. Physicians are still expected to deliver the same standard of care -- including costly resources - to everyone, regardless whether it is paid for. Health plans can now face litigation for virtually any unfortunate outcome, even those stemming from society''s mandate to keep costs down while improving population health. This book cuts through the chaos and offers a clear, persuasive resolution. Part I explains why new economic realities have rendered prevailing malpractice and contract law largely anachronistic. Part II argues that pointing the legal finger of blame blindly or hastily can hinder good medical care. Instead of "whom do we want to hold liable," we should focus first on "who should be doing what, for the best delivery of health care." When things go wrong, each should be liable only for those aspects of care they could and should have controlled. Once a good division of labor is identified, what kind of liability should be imposed depends on what kind of mistake was made. Failures to exercise adequate expertise (knowledge, skill, care effort) should be addressed as torts, while failures to provide promised resources should be resolved under contract. Part III shows that this approach, though novel, fits remarkably well with basic common law doctrines, and can even enlighten ERISA issues. With extensive documentation from current case law, commentary, and empirical literature, the book will also serve as a comprehensive reference for attorneys, law professors, physicians, administrators, bioethicists, and students.

The issues explored in this book have unfortunately come to be known as ''maternal-fetal conflicts''. The phrase is unsatisfactory because it is misleading: It places the emphasis on the well-being of the fetus instead of on the born child (who will bear the burden of any harm done prenatally); it assumes a conflict between a pregnant women and her offspring (while the issue is usually more complex and more broadly based); and it incorrectly implies that all pregnant women are appropriately regarded as mothers. For these reasons, I have chosen to avoid the phrase ''matern- fetal conflict'' altogether, and will instead speak in terms of ''preventable prenatal harm''. I mention this at the outset, for those of you familiar with ''maternal-fetal conflicts'' who might be wondering if I am addressing the same issues. Yes. But I am trying to look at them in a new - and I hope more fruitful - way. I would like to thank the other participants in the Hastings Center''s maternal-fetal project - especially those who disageed with me - for being so thought-provoking. And I owe a lasting debt of gratitude to Henry Ruth and Allen Buchanan for their invaluable counsel.

The issues explored in this book have unfortunately come to be known as 'maternal-fetal conflicts'. The phrase is unsatisfactory because it is misleading: It places the emphasis on the well-being of the fetus instead of on the born child (who will bear the burden of any harm done prenatally); it assumes a conflict between a pregnant women and her offspring (while the issue is usually more complex and more broadly based); and it incorrectly implies that all pregnant women are appropriately regarded as mothers. For these reasons, I have chosen to avoid the phrase 'matern- fetal conflict' altogether, and will instead speak in terms of 'preventable prenatal harm'. I mention this at the outset, for those of you familiar with 'maternal-fetal conflicts' who might be wondering if I am addressing the same issues. Yes. But I am trying to look at them in a new - and I hope more fruitful - way. I would like to thank the other participants in the Hastings Center's maternal-fetal project - especially those who disageed with me - for being so thought-provoking. And I owe a lasting debt of gratitude to Henry Ruth and Allen Buchanan for their invaluable counsel.

The issues explored in this book have unfortunately come to be known as 'maternal-fetal conflicts'. The phrase is unsatisfactory because it is misleading: It places the emphasis on the well-being of the fetus instead of on the born child (who will bear the burden of any harm done prenatally); it assumes a conflict between a pregnant women and her offspring (while the issue is usually more complex and more broadly based); and it incorrectly implies that all pregnant women are appropriately regarded as mothers. For these reasons, I have chosen to avoid the phrase 'matern- fetal conflict' altogether, and will instead speak in terms of 'preventable prenatal harm'. I mention this at the outset, for those of you familiar with 'maternal-fetal conflicts' who might be wondering if I am addressing the same issues. Yes. But I am trying to look at them in a new - and I hope more fruitful - way. I would like to thank the other participants in the Hastings Center's maternal-fetal project - especially those who disageed with me - for being so thought-provoking. And I owe a lasting debt of gratitude to Henry Ruth and Allen Buchanan for their invaluable counsel.