J. N. Findlay – författare

Originally published in 1970. This book is a collection of lectures and papers given by Professor Findlay in the 1960s. The theme is an argument for a metaphysical Absolute, in the sense of post-Hegelian Idealism. Findlay’s word for the Absolute process is ‘Enterprise’, which must be necessary in thought and reality. This ontological argument goes further that previous cosmological arguments and addresses both traditions from ancient philosophy and the modern Anglo-American school of philosophy. The book discusses the case for a Perfect Being, a Necessary Being and, in a change to Findlay’s previous published thought, presents a case for mysticism.

Originally published in 1970. This book is a collection of lectures and papers given by Professor Findlay in the 1960s. The theme is an argument for a metaphysical Absolute, in the sense of post-Hegelian Idealism. Findlay’s word for the Absolute process is ‘Enterprise’, which must be necessary in thought and reality. This ontological argument goes further that previous cosmological arguments and addresses both traditions from ancient philosophy and the modern Anglo-American school of philosophy. The book discusses the case for a Perfect Being, a Necessary Being and, in a change to Findlay’s previous published thought, presents a case for mysticism.

Philosophical themes as diverse as language, value, mind and God are among the topics discussed in this book, originally published in 1963. Considerably influential, there are contributions on Time, Camrbidge Philosophy, Doedelian Sentences, Morality by Convention and the Non-Existence of God. They reflect a gradual move from a position where the influence of Wittgenstein is paramount, to a position where there is considerable criticism of linguistic philosophy and a growing interest in the approaches of Hegel and the phenomenologists.

Professor Findlay in this book, originally published in 1961, set out to justify, and to some extent carry out, a ‘material value-ethic’, ie. A systematic setting forth of the ends of rational action.

The book is in the tradition of Moore, Rashfall, Ross, Scheler and Hartmann though it avoids altogether dogmatic intuitive methods. It argues that an organised framework of ends of action follows from the attitude underlying our moral pronouncements, and that this framework, while allowing personal elaboration, is not a matter for individual decision. The relations connecting our fundamental value-judgements with one another, and the frames of mind behind them, are not rigorously deductive but are sufficiently compelling to be called logical. Something of a ‘transcendental deduction’ of a well-ordered family for our basic heads of valuation is both possible and necessary. The work is further critical of the notion of obligation which has been extended far beyond legal contracts and understandings. The book also contains a chapter on religion.

Professor Findlay in this book, originally published in 1961, set out to justify, and to some extent carry out, a ‘material value-ethic’, ie. A systematic setting forth of the ends of rational action.

The book is in the tradition of Moore, Rashfall, Ross, Scheler and Hartmann though it avoids altogether dogmatic intuitive methods. It argues that an organised framework of ends of action follows from the attitude underlying our moral pronouncements, and that this framework, while allowing personal elaboration, is not a matter for individual decision. The relations connecting our fundamental value-judgements with one another, and the frames of mind behind them, are not rigorously deductive but are sufficiently compelling to be called logical. Something of a ‘transcendental deduction’ of a well-ordered family for our basic heads of valuation is both possible and necessary. The work is further critical of the notion of obligation which has been extended far beyond legal contracts and understandings. The book also contains a chapter on religion.