Jacob Weinrib – författare

Constitutional rights are often seen as invitations to engage in all things considered moral reasoning about how public authorities should act. The Impasse of Constitutional Rights challenges this widely accepted view by showing that it generates an irresolvable deadlock between rival theories of constitutional rights that share the same defects. This Element develops the alternative idea that rights-based constitutional order has its own distinctive moral project, which consists in rendering public authority accountable to the inherent rights of each legal subject. Taking this project seriously requires reconceiving the basic building blocks of rights-based constitutional order: justification, purposive interpretation, and proportionality. The resulting account both escapes the impasse to which the leading contemporary theories of constitutional rights succumb and expounds the normative connection between rights-based constitutional order and its most fundamental doctrines.

Constitutional rights are often seen as invitations to engage in all things considered moral reasoning about how public authorities should act. The Impasse of Constitutional Rights challenges this widely accepted view by showing that it generates an irresolvable deadlock between rival theories of constitutional rights that share the same defects. This Element develops the alternative idea that rights-based constitutional order has its own distinctive moral project, which consists in rendering public authority accountable to the inherent rights of each legal subject. Taking this project seriously requires reconceiving the basic building blocks of rights-based constitutional order: justification, purposive interpretation, and proportionality. The resulting account both escapes the impasse to which the leading contemporary theories of constitutional rights succumb and expounds the normative connection between rights-based constitutional order and its most fundamental doctrines.

In an age of constitutional revolutions and reforms, theory and practice are moving in opposite directions. As a matter of constitutional practice, human dignity has emerged in jurisdictions around the world as the organizing idea of a groundbreaking paradigm. By reconfiguring constitutional norms, institutional structures and legal doctrines, this paradigm transforms human dignity from a mere moral claim into a legal norm that persons have standing to vindicate. As a matter of constitutional theory, however, human dignity remains an enigmatic idea. Some explicate its meaning in abstraction from constitutional practice, while others confine themselves to less exalted ideas. The result is a chasm that separates constitutional practice from a theory capable of justifying its innovations and guiding its operation. By expounding the connection between human dignity and the constitutional practices that justify themselves in its light, Jacob Weinrib brings the theory and practice of constitutional law back together.