James B. Freeman – författare

When, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an argument? What is the proper criterion of premise acceptability? Can the criterion be theoretically or philosophically justified? This is the first book to provide a comprehensive theory of premise acceptability and it answers the questions above from an epistemological approach that the author calls common sense foundationalism. It will be eagerly sought out not just by specialists in informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation theory but also by a broader range of philosophers and those teaching rhetoric.

When, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an argument? What is the proper criterion of premise acceptability? Can the criterion be theoretically or philosophically justified? This is the first book to provide a comprehensive theory of premise acceptability and it answers the questions above from an epistemological approach that the author calls common sense foundationalism. It will be eagerly sought out not just by specialists in informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation theory but also by a broader range of philosophers and those teaching rhetoric.

An anthology of the most important historical sources, classical and modern, on the subjects of presumptions and burdens of proof In the last fifty years, the study of argumentation has become one of the most exciting intellectual crossroads in the modern academy. Two of the most central concepts of argumentation theory are presumptions and burdens of proof. Their functions have been explicitly recognized in legal theory since the middle ages, but their pervasive presence in all forms of argumentation and in inquiries beyond the law—including politics, science, religion, philosophy, and interpersonal communication—have been the object of study since the nineteenth century. However, the documents and essays central to any discussion of presumptions and burdens of proof as devices of argumentation are scattered across a variety of remote sources in rhetoric, law, and philosophy. Presumptions and Burdens of Proof: An Anthology of Argumentation and the Law brings together for the first time key texts relating to the history of the theory of presumptions along with contemporary studies that identify and give insight into the issues facing students and scholars today. The collection’s first half contains historical sources and begins with excerpts from Aristotle’s Topics and goes on to include the locus classicus chapter from Bishop Whately’s crucial Elements of Rhetoric as well as later reactions to Whately’s views. The second half of the collection contains contemporary essays by contributors from the fields of law, philosophy, rhetoric, and argumentation and communication theory. These essays explore contemporary understandings of presumptions and burdens of proof and their role in numerous contexts today. This anthology is the definitive resource on the subject of these crucial rhetorical modes and will be a vital resource to all scholars of communication and rhetoric, as well as legal scholars and practicing jurists.

This book presents a comprehensive picture of when the premises of an argument are adequately connected to its conclusion. The author draws upon the familiar Toulmin model, Rescher’s discussion of presumption and burden of proof, and L. Jonathan Cohen’s presentation of the method of relevant variables.The book first assesses the warrant or inference rule connecting the premises to the conclusion. To analyzes this, the author asks a series of questions such as - should the warrant be evaluated by conclusive or defeasible standards? Does the argument require that its premises, if acceptable, guarantee that the conclusion is acceptable also or does it allow the premises just to present a body of relevant evidence? Is the inference rule backed or supported a priori or a posteriori? These distinctions form four categories of warrants: conclusive a priori, defeasible a posteriori, defeasible a priori, and virtually conclusive a posteriori. The warrants in each category are evaluated differently for how strongly the premises support the conclusion of arguments instancing those warrants. After presenting the rationale for this division and discussing our nonprobabilistic approach, the author analyzes the connection adequacy for each of these types of warrants. This book is of interest to scholars of argumentation theory.

This book presents a comprehensive picture of when the premises of an argument are adequately connected to its conclusion. The author draws upon the familiar Toulmin model, Rescher’s discussion of presumption and burden of proof, and L. Jonathan Cohen’s presentation of the method of relevant variables.The book first assesses the warrant or inference rule connecting the premises to the conclusion. To analyzes this, the author asks a series of questions such as - should the warrant be evaluated by conclusive or defeasible standards? Does the argument require that its premises, if acceptable, guarantee that the conclusion is acceptable also or does it allow the premises just to present a body of relevant evidence? Is the inference rule backed or supported a priori or a posteriori? These distinctions form four categories of warrants: conclusive a priori, defeasible a posteriori, defeasible a priori, and virtually conclusive a posteriori. The warrants in each category are evaluated differently for how strongly the premises support the conclusion of arguments instancing those warrants. After presenting the rationale for this division and discussing our nonprobabilistic approach, the author analyzes the connection adequacy for each of these types of warrants. This book is of interest to scholars of argumentation theory.

No detailed description available for "Dialectics and the Macrostructure of Arguments".

No detailed description available for "e;Dialectics and the Macrostructure of Arguments"e;.

This monograph first presents a method of diagramming argument macrostructure, synthesizing the standard circle and arrow approach with the Toulmin model. A theoretical justification of this method through a dialectical understanding of argument, a critical examination of Toulmin on warrants, a thorough discussion of the linked-convergent distinction, and an account of the proper reconstruction of enthymemes follows.

This monograph first presents a method of diagramming argument macrostructure, synthesizing the standard circle and arrow approach with the Toulmin model. A theoretical justification of this method through a dialectical understanding of argument, a critical examination of Toulmin on warrants, a thorough discussion of the linked-convergent distinction, and an account of the proper reconstruction of enthymemes follows.