James Gannon – författare

This book offers a perspective decidedly different from that of the Bush Administration and its neoconservative supporters. Since the United Nations embraced the right of national self-determination in 1945, the historical odds have been unfavorable to great powers that impose military occupations on smaller nations. This point is bolstered by the evidence from history, and is particularly pertinent to the American occupation of Iraq, where a robust insurgency has delayed projected successes by the administration and wartime planners. Drawing on historical antecedents to the occupation of Iraq, Gannon examines events such as the British Struggles in Palestine, French enterprises in Algeria, the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan, and other instances in which occupying powers to demonstrate the struggles and failures of occupying powers in the face of determined insurgencies.Since the United Nations adopted the principle of national self-determination in 1945, great powers like the United States that occupy smaller nations like Iraq lose more often than not when confronted with credible insurgencies. The evidence is taken from recent history: the Zionist victory over Britain in Palestine, and the defeats of France in Algeria, America in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and Israel in Lebanon. On the surface these outcomes seem perverse-powerful modern armies brought down by rag-tag rebels. The explanation comes from the types of warfare fought. Great powers are equipped to fight other great powers in great battles over large territory. Rebels fight shadow wars, neutralizing the fire power and mobility of the occupying army. Insurgencies continue for years, allowing political considerations to come into play, including propaganda, international pressure, and the stream of dead and wounded returning from the war zone. The home front turns against the war, and new policymakers conclude that the nation's interests are best served by getting out. History is not an exact science, so the judgment here is expressed in probability, not certainty; witness the British defeat of insurgencies in Malaya and Kenya before giving up these colonies, and the four-decades-old Israeli occupation and partial colonization of the West Bank.

This book offers a perspective decidedly different from that of the Bush Administration and its neoconservative supporters. Since the United Nations embraced the right of national self-determination in 1945, the historical odds have been unfavorable to great powers that impose military occupations on smaller nations. This point is bolstered by the evidence from history, and is particularly pertinent to the American occupation of Iraq, where a robust insurgency has delayed projected successes by the administration and wartime planners. Drawing on historical antecedents to the occupation of Iraq, Gannon examines events such as the British Struggles in Palestine, French enterprises in Algeria, the Soviet debacle in Afghanistan, and other instances in which occupying powers to demonstrate the struggles and failures of occupying powers in the face of determined insurgencies.Since the United Nations adopted the principle of national self-determination in 1945, great powers like the United States that occupy smaller nations like Iraq lose more often than not when confronted with credible insurgencies. The evidence is taken from recent history: the Zionist victory over Britain in Palestine, and the defeats of France in Algeria, America in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and Israel in Lebanon. On the surface these outcomes seem perverse-powerful modern armies brought down by rag-tag rebels. The explanation comes from the types of warfare fought. Great powers are equipped to fight other great powers in great battles over large territory. Rebels fight shadow wars, neutralizing the fire power and mobility of the occupying army. Insurgencies continue for years, allowing political considerations to come into play, including propaganda, international pressure, and the stream of dead and wounded returning from the war zone. The home front turns against the war, and new policymakers conclude that the nation's interests are best served by getting out. History is not an exact science, so the judgment here is expressed in probability, not certainty; witness the British defeat of insurgencies in Malaya and Kenya before giving up these colonies, and the four-decades-old Israeli occupation and partial colonization of the West Bank.

Since the United Nations adopted the principle of self-determination in 1945, great powers have found that military strength is no guarantee of success in small wars fought against insurgents who use guerrilla and terrorist tactics. The author argues that it is well past time for Americans to understand that military victory is usually beyond their reach in this kind of warfare. Although Gannon believes that the war in Afghanistan is justified by the attacks of 9/11, he contends that the American and NATO forces should withdraw as soon as can be done responsibly. As Gannon sees it, President Barack Obama realizes that such long, drawn-out wars waste lives and drain resources far out of proportion to any possible gain.The dual-track strategy in Afghanistan now, Gannon explains, is to apply the lessons of Iraq's Anbar Awakening by negating the Islamists' influence, driving them out of population centers—with military force, if necessary—and building trust between the tribes in the hinterlands and the central government. At the same time, the American and NATO commanders must encourage negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The goal is a stable, peaceful Afghanistan. The fight against such Islamist fanatics as al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban requires a different strategy—a relentless campaign using special operations forces and high-tech weapons such as drones to disrupt insurgents' operations. Only when Afghanistan has become stabilized and anti-government operations disrupted can America and NATO safely withdraw, according to Gannon. Nobody should think it will be quick or easy.

The first book-length treatment of an important Confederate regiment composed mostly of Irish immigrants who were involved in most of the important Civil War battles in the East.