Jennifer Carpenter – författare

Covering the eleventh throughsixteenth centuries, these essays suggest that influence and power mayhave paradoxically been available to women despite, and sometimes preciselybecause of, their subordinate position in society. Striking for its rangeof scholarship, this collection explores the power and independence, relationshipsand influence of medieval queens, holy women, mothers, widows, Jewishconversas, and others. Latin and Anglo-Norman hagiography, confessors'manuals, coronation rituals, responsa literature, and legal theoryare represented."An intriguing explorationof a basic paradox of medieval society, and an excellent blend of theoryand gender studies with detailed work relevant for social and politicalhistory." -- Joel Rosenthal, author of Patriarchy and Families of Privilege in Fifteenth-Century EnglandJENNIFER CARPENTERis a lecturer in history at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.

Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top US executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.

Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.