John Rickard – författare

For General George S. Patton, Jr., the battle for Lorraine during the fall and winter of 1944 was a frustrating and grueling experience of static warfare. Plagued by supply shortages, critical interference from superiors, flooded rivers, fortified cities, and the highly-determined German army, Patton had little opportunity to wage a fast armored campaign. Rickard examines Patton's generalship during these bitter battles and suggests that Patton was unable to adapt to the new realities of the campaign, thereby failing to wage the most effective warfare possible.By the beginning of the Ardennes offensive, Patton had crippled his worthy opponent, but had suffered the highest casualties of any campaign that he conducted during the war. Until now, his better known exploits in Sicily and Normandy have overshadowed this campaign. Relying on a broad range of sources, this treatment of Patton's operational performance in Lorraine goes beyond the official history. It describes Patton's philosophy of war and explains why it essentially failed in Lorraine. Supplemented by full orders of battle, casualty and equipment losses, and excellent maps, Patton at Bay is a penetrating study of America's best fighting general.

This is the companion volume in the author's deep dive into the major operations fought by the II Canadian Corps in the Normandy campaign. II Canadian Corps was at the epicenter of the action on the eastern flank where the vaunted I SS Panzer Corps struggled mightily to hold the critical Caen anchor. The Canadians faced the very best of the Waffen SS including the Hitler Youth 12th SS Panzer Division.The book covers the last two major British and Canadian joint operations including TOTALIZE and TRACTABLE and the battle for the Falaise Pocket. The book explores both the corps commander’s actions (Simonds) and that of Army commander (Montgomery) and places them in relation to American operations.

The first of two volumes, Monty’s Normandy Hammer traces the major operations fought by Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds’ II Canadian Corps in July 1944. Thrust into the epicentre of the action on the eastern flank, II Canadian Corps planned and executed two major operations to expand Second British Army’s elbow room in the bridgehead even while holding the panzer divisions of the vaunted I SS Panzer Corps in place near Caen. Operation ATLANTIC, tied in with Operation GOODWOOD, completed the clearance of Caen and established bridgeheads over the Orne. Operation SPRING was a great holding attack to support Montgomery’s main effort of the entire campaign, the breakout launched by the Americans codenamed COBRA. Rickard goes into exceptional detail and paints a fresh picture of Simonds as a corps commander and his role in achieving Montgomery’s army group strategy. Monty’ Normandy Hammer is an insightful study of command at various levels. The follow-on volume will trace the fortunes of II Canadian Corps in the climatic battles in August.