Jules Coleman - Böcker

Jules Coleman, one of the world's most influential philosophers of law here expounds his recent views on a range of important issues in legal theory. Coleman offers for the first time an explicit account of the pragmatist method that has long informed his work, and takes on the views of highly respected contemporaries such as Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz.The first part of the book builds on Coleman's well-known 'corrective justice' account of tort law, highlighting the sophisticated pragmatist methodology that he brings to bear on legal theory and presing further his critique of the law and economics school of legal analysis. The second part advances a new articulation of the jurisprudential view associated most closely with Coleman - Inclusive Legal Positivism. Many of Coleman's most controversial claims are here defended as part of a comprehensive new account of law as a conventional practice. The third part takes up the question whether conceptual analysis of the law - an approach that has long dominated philosophical thinking on the topic - is even possible. Rejecting recent arguments that it must be replaced by a normative or naturalized jurisprudence, Coleman defends his distinctive form of pragmatist conceptual analysis.

One of the first volumes in the new series of prestigious Oxford Handbooks, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law brings together specially commissioned essays by twenty-six of the foremost legal theorists currently writing, to provide a state of the art overview of jurisprudential scholarship. Each author presents an account of the contending views and scholarly debates animating their field of enquiry as well as setting the agenda for further study. This landmark publication will be essential reading for anyone working in legal theory and of interest to legal scholars, philosophers and legal theorists looking for an introduction to current jurisprudential thinking.

Jules Coleman, one of the world's most influential philosophers of law here expounds his recent views on a range of important issues in legal theory. Coleman offers for the first time an explicit account of the pragmatist method that has long informed his work, and takes on the views of highly respected contemporaries such as Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz. The first part of the book builds on Coleman's well-known 'corrective justice' account of tort law, highlighting the sophisticated pragmatist methodology that he brings to bear on legal theory and pressing further his critique of the law and economics school of legal analysis. The second part advances a new articulation of the jurisprudential view associated most closely with Coleman - Inclusive Legal Positivism. Many of Coleman's most controversial claims are here defended as part of a comprehensive new account of law as a conventional practice. The third part takes up the question whether conceptual analysis of the law - an approach that has long dominated philosophical thinking on the topic - is even possible. Rejecting recent arguments that it must be replaced by a normative or naturalized jurisprudence, Coleman defends his distinctive form of pragmatist conceptual analysis.