Kelechi A. Kalu – författare

This book compares the rapid development of South Korea over the past 70 years with selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa to assess what factors contributed to the country’s success story, and why it is that countries that were comparable in the past continue to experience challenges in achieving and sustaining economic growth.

In the 1950s, South Korea’s GDP per capita was $876, roughly comparable with that of Cote d’Ivoire and somewhat below Ghana’s. The country’s subsequent transformation from a war-ravaged, international aid-dependent economy to the 13th largest economy in the world has been the focus of considerable international admiration and attention. But how was it that South Korea succeeded in multiplying its GDP per capita by a factor of 23, while other Less Developed Countries continue to experience challenges? This book compares South Korea’s politics of development and foreign assistance with that of Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia, which were also major recipients of the U.S. aid, to investigate the specific contexts that made it possible for South Korea to achieve success. Overall, this book argues that effective state capacity in South Korea’s domestic and international politics provided an anchor for diplomatic engagement with donors and guided domestic political actors in the effective use of aid for economic development.

This book will be of interest to researchers and students working on development, comparative political economy, and foreign aid, and to policy makers and practitioners looking for a greater understanding of comparative development trajectories.

This book compares the rapid development of South Korea over the past 70 years with selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa to assess what factors contributed to the country’s success story, and why it is that countries that were comparable in the past continue to experience challenges in achieving and sustaining economic growth.

In the 1950s, South Korea’s GDP per capita was $876, roughly comparable with that of Cote d’Ivoire and somewhat below Ghana’s. The country’s subsequent transformation from a war-ravaged, international aid-dependent economy to the 13th largest economy in the world has been the focus of considerable international admiration and attention. But how was it that South Korea succeeded in multiplying its GDP per capita by a factor of 23, while other Less Developed Countries continue to experience challenges? This book compares South Korea’s politics of development and foreign assistance with that of Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia, which were also major recipients of the U.S. aid, to investigate the specific contexts that made it possible for South Korea to achieve success. Overall, this book argues that effective state capacity in South Korea’s domestic and international politics provided an anchor for diplomatic engagement with donors and guided domestic political actors in the effective use of aid for economic development.

This book will be of interest to researchers and students working on development, comparative political economy, and foreign aid, and to policy makers and practitioners looking for a greater understanding of comparative development trajectories.

United States-Africa relations have experienced four major cycles. The first cycle was during the Cold War(1960-1990). During this period, the U.S. developed a one-sided relationship with various African states in which the latter served as "foot soldiers" for the U.S. in its competition with the Soviet Union for global domination. Among other things, the various client African states provided the U.S. with access to airfields, deep water ports and sites for the establishment of various intelligence gathering facilities. In addition, the U.S. used various groups like UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi in Angola to undermine and fight pro-Soviet regimes on the continent.

The second cycle of the relationship covered the period 1991-1998. During this time, the U.S. scaled down its security activities in Africa. The major reason was that with the end of the Cold War Africa(with few exceptions like Egypt) was no longer a major front for the promotion of U.S. Security interests.

The third cycle commenced in 1998 and ended in 2001. This period was characterized by the U.S.’ search for an approach to frame its security relations with Africa. In this vein, the U.S. undertook various military-security initiatives .

The fourth cycle began after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the American homeland. Since then, the U.S. has expanded the scope of its security relations with Africa, as reflected in the establishment of various initiatives and programs. At the core is the prosecution of the American "war on terror."

Against this backdrop, this book examines some of the major dimensions of the U.S.’ security relations with Africa, including American security interests on the continent, the "war on terror," AFRICOM, and military cooperation. Using the book’s integrative theoretical framework, each of the chapters in the volume examines the various factors that shape the issue of focus.

United States-Africa relations have experienced four major cycles. The first cycle was during the Cold War(1960-1990). During this period, the U.S. developed a one-sided relationship with various African states in which the latter served as "foot soldiers" for the U.S. in its competition with the Soviet Union for global domination. Among other things, the various client African states provided the U.S. with access to airfields, deep water ports and sites for the establishment of various intelligence gathering facilities. In addition, the U.S. used various groups like UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi in Angola to undermine and fight pro-Soviet regimes on the continent.

The second cycle of the relationship covered the period 1991-1998. During this time, the U.S. scaled down its security activities in Africa. The major reason was that with the end of the Cold War Africa(with few exceptions like Egypt) was no longer a major front for the promotion of U.S. Security interests.

The third cycle commenced in 1998 and ended in 2001. This period was characterized by the U.S.’ search for an approach to frame its security relations with Africa. In this vein, the U.S. undertook various military-security initiatives .

The fourth cycle began after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the American homeland. Since then, the U.S. has expanded the scope of its security relations with Africa, as reflected in the establishment of various initiatives and programs. At the core is the prosecution of the American "war on terror."

Against this backdrop, this book examines some of the major dimensions of the U.S.’ security relations with Africa, including American security interests on the continent, the "war on terror," AFRICOM, and military cooperation. Using the book’s integrative theoretical framework, each of the chapters in the volume examines the various factors that shape the issue of focus.