Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. Replacing Truth opens with an overview of work on the nature of truth (e.g., correspondence theories, deflationism), work on the liar and related paradoxes, and a comprehensive scheme for combining these two literatures into a unified study of the concept truth. Scharp argues that truthis best understood as an inconsistent concept, and proposes a detailed theory of inconsistent concepts that can be applied to the case of truth. Truth also happens to be a useful concept, but its inconsistency inhibits its utility; as such, it should be replaced with consistent concepts that can do truth''sjob without giving rise to paradoxes. To this end, Scharp offers a pair of replacements, which he dubs ascending truth and descending truth, along with an axiomatic theory of them and a new kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory. As for the nature of truth, he goes on to develop Davidson''s idea that it is best understood as the core of a measurement system for rational phenomena (e.g., belief, desire, and meaning). The book finishes with a semantic theory that treats truth predicatesas assessment-sensitive (i.e., their extension is relative to a context of assessment), and a demonstration of how this theory solves the problems posed by the liar and other paradoxes.

Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They usethis view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be- rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.

Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They usethis view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be- rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.

Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They use this view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be- rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.

Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. Replacing Truth opens with an overview of work on the nature of truth (e.g., correspondence theories, deflationism), work on the liar and related paradoxes, and a comprehensive scheme for combining these two literatures into a unified study of the concept truth. Scharp argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept, and proposes a detailed theory of inconsistent concepts that can be applied to the case of truth. Truth also happens to be a useful concept, but its inconsistency inhibits its utility; as such, it should be replaced with consistent concepts that can do truth's job without giving rise to paradoxes. To this end, Scharp offers a pair of replacements, which he dubs ascending truth and descending truth, along with an axiomatic theory of them and a new kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory. As for the nature of truth, he goes on to develop Davidson's idea that it is best understood as the core of a measurement system for rational phenomena (e.g., belief, desire, and meaning). The book finishes with a semantic theory that treats truth predicates as assessment-sensitive (i.e., their extension is relative to a context of assessment), and a demonstration of how this theory solves the problems posed by the liar and other paradoxes.

Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) was, in the opinion of many, the most important American philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century. He was, Richard Rorty writes, "as original a mind as C. S. Peirce, and it has taken almost as long for the importance of his ideas to be appreciated." This collection, coedited by Sellars's chief interpreter and intellectual heir, should do much to elucidate and clearly establish the significance of this difficult thinker's vision for contemporary philosophy.The volume presents the most readable of Sellars's essays in a sequence that illuminates what Robert Brandom calls the "inferentialist" conception of meaning at the heart of his work. This conception, laid out in the early essays, is deployed in various epistemological contexts throughout the book so that, upon arriving at the concluding papers on Kant, the reader has been given a tour d'horizon not only of the central topics of philosophy of mind and language, but of much of the history of philosophy as well--and, with this, a sense of what a shifting of analytic philosophy from its Humean into its Kantian stage would entail.

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this first of three volumes is dedicated to core foundational issues in conceptual engineering: questions about the nature and varieties of conceptual engineering, whether engineering a concept necessarily preserves core features of a concept, and where the normative limits of conceptual engineering lie. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel, Delia Belleri, Paul Egré & Cathal O’Madagain, Peter Gardener, Hans-Johan Glock, James Hampton, Allison Koslow, Esa Díaz León, and Sarah Sawyer.

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this first of three volumes is dedicated to core foundational issues in conceptual engineering: questions about the nature and varieties of conceptual engineering, whether engineering a concept necessarily preserves core features of a concept, and where the normative limits of conceptual engineering lie. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel, Delia Belleri, Paul Egré & Cathal O’Madagain, Peter Gardener, Hans-Johan Glock, James Hampton, Allison Koslow, Esa Díaz León, and Sarah Sawyer.

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this second of three volumes develops novel connections between conceptual engineering and a variety of fields and methods in analytic philosophy. It applies conceptual engineering to various philosophical questions and explores its relation to established philosophical practices. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Kwame Anthony Appiah, Sanford Goldberg, Frank Jackson, Tristam McPherson & David Plunkett, Teresa Marques, Mari Mikkola, Jennifer Nado, and Mona Simion.

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this second of three volumes develops novel connections between conceptual engineering and a variety of fields and methods in analytic philosophy. It applies conceptual engineering to various philosophical questions and explores its relation to established philosophical practices. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Kwame Anthony Appiah, Sanford Goldberg, Frank Jackson, Tristam McPherson & David Plunkett, Teresa Marques, Mari Mikkola, Jennifer Nado, and Mona Simion.

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this third of three volumes focuses on applications of conceptual engineering to specific cases, including medical concepts, psychiatric concepts, concepts for social groups, concepts pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic, environmental concepts, political concepts, and concepts in jurisdiction. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Roberto Casati and colleagues, Rachel Cooper, Elisabetta Lalumera, Ethan Landes, Genoveva Martí & Lorena Ludeña-Ramírez, Kevin Reuter & Lucien Baumgartner, and Katherine Ritchie.

Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. Replacing Truth opens with an overview of work on the nature of truth (e.g., correspondence theories, deflationism), work on the liar and related paradoxes, and a comprehensive scheme for combining these two literatures into a unified study of the concept truth. Scharp argues that truthis best understood as an inconsistent concept, and proposes a detailed theory of inconsistent concepts that can be applied to the case of truth. Truth also happens to be a useful concept, but its inconsistency inhibits its utility; as such, it should be replaced with consistent concepts that can do truth''sjob without giving rise to paradoxes. To this end, Scharp offers a pair of replacements, which he dubs ascending truth and descending truth, along with an axiomatic theory of them and a new kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory. As for the nature of truth, he goes on to develop Davidson''s idea that it is best understood as the core of a measurement system for rational phenomena (e.g., belief, desire, and meaning). The book finishes with a semantic theory that treats truth predicatesas assessment-sensitive (i.e., their extension is relative to a context of assessment), and a demonstration of how this theory solves the problems posed by the liar and other paradoxes.

Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They usethis view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be- rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.

Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They usethis view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be- rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.

Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion (QUD) Reasons Contextualism. They use this view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be- rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.

Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. Replacing Truth opens with an overview of work on the nature of truth (e.g., correspondence theories, deflationism), work on the liar and related paradoxes, and a comprehensive scheme for combining these two literatures into a unified study of the concept truth. Scharp argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept, and proposes a detailed theory of inconsistent concepts that can be applied to the case of truth. Truth also happens to be a useful concept, but its inconsistency inhibits its utility; as such, it should be replaced with consistent concepts that can do truth's job without giving rise to paradoxes. To this end, Scharp offers a pair of replacements, which he dubs ascending truth and descending truth, along with an axiomatic theory of them and a new kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory. As for the nature of truth, he goes on to develop Davidson's idea that it is best understood as the core of a measurement system for rational phenomena (e.g., belief, desire, and meaning). The book finishes with a semantic theory that treats truth predicates as assessment-sensitive (i.e., their extension is relative to a context of assessment), and a demonstration of how this theory solves the problems posed by the liar and other paradoxes.

Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) was, in the opinion of many, the most important American philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century. He was, Richard Rorty writes, "as original a mind as C. S. Peirce, and it has taken almost as long for the importance of his ideas to be appreciated." This collection, coedited by Sellars's chief interpreter and intellectual heir, should do much to elucidate and clearly establish the significance of this difficult thinker's vision for contemporary philosophy.The volume presents the most readable of Sellars's essays in a sequence that illuminates what Robert Brandom calls the "inferentialist" conception of meaning at the heart of his work. This conception, laid out in the early essays, is deployed in various epistemological contexts throughout the book so that, upon arriving at the concluding papers on Kant, the reader has been given a tour d'horizon not only of the central topics of philosophy of mind and language, but of much of the history of philosophy as well--and, with this, a sense of what a shifting of analytic philosophy from its Humean into its Kantian stage would entail.

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this first of three volumes is dedicated to core foundational issues in conceptual engineering: questions about the nature and varieties of conceptual engineering, whether engineering a concept necessarily preserves core features of a concept, and where the normative limits of conceptual engineering lie. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel, Delia Belleri, Paul Egré & Cathal O’Madagain, Peter Gardener, Hans-Johan Glock, James Hampton, Allison Koslow, Esa Díaz León, and Sarah Sawyer.

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this first of three volumes is dedicated to core foundational issues in conceptual engineering: questions about the nature and varieties of conceptual engineering, whether engineering a concept necessarily preserves core features of a concept, and where the normative limits of conceptual engineering lie. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Derek Ball & Bryan Pickel, Delia Belleri, Paul Egré & Cathal O’Madagain, Peter Gardener, Hans-Johan Glock, James Hampton, Allison Koslow, Esa Díaz León, and Sarah Sawyer.

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this second of three volumes develops novel connections between conceptual engineering and a variety of fields and methods in analytic philosophy. It applies conceptual engineering to various philosophical questions and explores its relation to established philosophical practices. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Kwame Anthony Appiah, Sanford Goldberg, Frank Jackson, Tristam McPherson & David Plunkett, Teresa Marques, Mari Mikkola, Jennifer Nado, and Mona Simion.

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this second of three volumes develops novel connections between conceptual engineering and a variety of fields and methods in analytic philosophy. It applies conceptual engineering to various philosophical questions and explores its relation to established philosophical practices. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Kwame Anthony Appiah, Sanford Goldberg, Frank Jackson, Tristam McPherson & David Plunkett, Teresa Marques, Mari Mikkola, Jennifer Nado, and Mona Simion.

Conceptual engineering is the method of critically assessing, improving, and replacing the concepts we use in thought and talk. Based on lectures by leading philosophers at the Conceptual Engineering Online Seminar 2020–2022, this third of three volumes focuses on applications of conceptual engineering to specific cases, including medical concepts, psychiatric concepts, concepts for social groups, concepts pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic, environmental concepts, political concepts, and concepts in jurisdiction. It is of interest to professional philosophers with expertise in metaphilosophy or those who seek to apply the methods of conceptual engineering to issues in their own areas of specialization, as well as philosophy students who want to get acquainted with the exciting and dynamic methodological developments of their discipline. This volume includes chapters by Roberto Casati and colleagues, Rachel Cooper, Elisabetta Lalumera, Ethan Landes, Genoveva Martí & Lorena Ludeña-Ramírez, Kevin Reuter & Lucien Baumgartner, and Katherine Ritchie.