Marcus Noland – författare

In the mid-1990s, as many as one million North Koreans died in one of the worst famines of the twentieth century. The socialist food distribution system collapsed primarily because of a misguided push for self-reliance, but was compounded by the regime's failure to formulate a quick response-including the blocking of desperately needed humanitarian relief. As households, enterprises, local party organs, and military units tried to cope with the economic collapse, a grassroots process of marketization took root. However, rather than embracing these changes, the North Korean regime opted for tentative economic reforms with ambiguous benefits and a self-destructive foreign policy. As a result, a chronic food shortage continues to plague North Korea today. In their carefully researched book, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland present the most comprehensive and penetrating account of the famine to date, examining not only the origins and aftermath of the crisis but also the regime's response to outside aid and the effect of its current policies on the country's economic future.Their study begins by considering the root causes of the famine, weighing the effects of the decline in the availability of food against its poor distribution. Then it takes a close look at the aid effort, addressing the difficulty of monitoring assistance within the country, and concludes with an analysis of current economic reforms and strategies of engagement. North Korea's famine exemplified the depredations that can arise from tyrannical rule and the dilemmas such regimes pose for the humanitarian community, as well as the obstacles inherent in achieving economic and political reform. To reveal the state's culpability in this tragic event is a vital project of historical recovery, one that is especially critical in light of our current engagement with the "North Korean question."

For half a century the US Congress effectively evaded its constitutional duty by allowing the US President to take the lead in the formulation of trade policy. The result was a system which avoided the danger of log-rolling exercises when setting tariffs. It facilitated the growth of trade and thus encouraged economic growth and rising living standards. For some, however, the system has shown signs of fragmentation arising from new pressures and challenges and is producing policy outcomes that lack coherence and rationale. New pressures include demands for trade protection arising from America's mounting trade deficit, as well as jolts to the system caused by the struggle to create a North America Free Trade Agreement. More recently, new demands largely unrelated to trade have perversely affected the policy as non-governmental organisations have demanded a role in its formulation, including those concerned with environmental, social and labour issues. To a significant extent they have effectively 'privatised' the policy process. Moreover, the US government has increasingly used trade policy for non-trade purposes - principally as a tool of foreign and security policy.The pro-liberalisation forces within Congress and the administration have been comprehensively outplayed. In the absence of political leadership and a greater public awareness of the issues at stake the stage is set for the still greater abuse of trade policy by narrow special interest groups in pursuit of particularist ends. In the circumstances, the best that can be hoped for may be a series of international agreements which could constrain the abuse of US domestic policy formulation. But even this will require greater courage and resolve by the advocates of free trade than has recently been shown.

Because authoritarian regimes like North Korea can impose the costs of sanctions on their citizens, these regimes constitute "hard targets." Yet authoritarian regimes may also be immune—and even hostile—to economic inducements if such inducements imply reform and opening. This book captures the effects of sanctions and inducements on North Korea and provides a detailed reconstruction of the role of economic incentives in the bargaining around the country's nuclear program. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland draw on an array of evidence to show the reluctance of the North Korean leadership to weaken its grip on foreign economic activity. They argue that inducements have limited effect on the regime, and instead urge policymakers to think in terms of gradual strategies. Hard Target connects economic statecraft to the marketization process to understand North Korea and addresses a larger debate over the merits and demerits of "engagement" with adversaries.

Because authoritarian regimes like North Korea can impose the costs of sanctions on their citizens, these regimes constitute "hard targets." Yet authoritarian regimes may also be immune—and even hostile—to economic inducements if such inducements imply reform and opening. This book captures the effects of sanctions and inducements on North Korea and provides a detailed reconstruction of the role of economic incentives in the bargaining around the country's nuclear program. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland draw on an array of evidence to show the reluctance of the North Korean leadership to weaken its grip on foreign economic activity. They argue that inducements have limited effect on the regime, and instead urge policymakers to think in terms of gradual strategies. Hard Target connects economic statecraft to the marketization process to understand North Korea and addresses a larger debate over the merits and demerits of "engagement" with adversaries.