Michael A. Einhorn – författare

Michael A. Einhorn In continuing to deregulate telecommunications companies, regulators have begun to consider alternative approaches to traditional cost-based price regulation as a means of encouraging monopoly efficiency, promulgating technological innova­ tion, protecting consumers, and reducing administrative costs. Under cost-based regulatory procedures that had been used, prices were designed to recover the regulated company's costs plus an allowed rate of return on its rate base; this strategy was costly to administer, provided no consistent incentives to cost-ef­ ficiency and technological improvement, afforded many opportunities for strategic misrepresentation of reported costs, and may have encouraged both uneconomic expansion of the utility's rate base and cross-subsidization of its competitive services. A category of alternative regulatory approaches can be classified broadly as social contracts. Under the general strategy of social contract regulation, regulators first delimit a group of regulated core services that they continue to regulate and then stipulate a list of constraints that the utility must agree to meet in the future; in exchange, regulators agree to detariff or deregulate entirely other competitive or nonessential services that the utility may offer. As long as no stipulated constraints are violated, the utility may price freely any service; if it reduces costs, it may keep a share of its profits. According to the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA, 1987), social contract agreements of one form or another have been considered or implemented in a majority of American states.

Electric utilities throughout the world continue to face new challenges involving ownership, market structure, and regulation. There are three related issues at hand. First, should ownership be private or public? Second, what operations should be integrated and where is competition feasible? Third, where is regulation necessary and can it be made more efficient? This volume bears directly upon these concerns. The book contains two sections. The first six articles discuss the British electricity experiment that has privatized and disintegrated the nation's generation, transmission and distribution companies, introduced market competition for power purchases, and implemented incentive regulation for monopolized transmission and distribution grids. The remaining articles focus on the theatre in which significant microeconomic issues will continue to emerge, most immediately in the UK and USA - the co-ordination and pricing of transmission.

The electric utility industry and its stakeholders in the. United States appear to be at a critical juncture in time. Powerful forces of global proportions are propelling the industry instinctively and in a secular fashion towards restructuring. That the industry will change is a fait accomplii. The nature and timing of the change is still a matter of intense debate, however. Because of the evolution of the industry into its present-day form, i.e. regulated local monopolies in their designated franchise service territories, the relative roles and expectations of various institutions would have to change to conform to the new state in the future. In either encouraging, or allowing this change to happen, society is essentially saying that future societal welfare would be better served by the changed structure contemplated. What that assumption translates into in more direct terms is that creation of future wealth would be better accomplished through redistribution of wealth today. Thoughtful individuals recognize the enormous responsibility placed upon the various entities empowered with jurisdiction over the timing and nature of the structural change. They are trying hard to bring analytical rigor to bear on the debate. One very critical element of this debate on restructuring is the issue of the treatment of transmission. The issue has been variously labeled transmission access, or pricing. Volumes have been written and spoken on this topic.

Michael A. Einhorn In continuing to deregulate telecommunications companies, regulators have begun to consider alternative approaches to traditional cost-based price regulation as a means of encouraging monopoly efficiency, promulgating technological innova­ tion, protecting consumers, and reducing administrative costs. Under cost-based regulatory procedures that had been used, prices were designed to recover the regulated company's costs plus an allowed rate of return on its rate base; this strategy was costly to administer, provided no consistent incentives to cost-ef­ ficiency and technological improvement, afforded many opportunities for strategic misrepresentation of reported costs, and may have encouraged both uneconomic expansion of the utility's rate base and cross-subsidization of its competitive services. A category of alternative regulatory approaches can be classified broadly as social contracts. Under the general strategy of social contract regulation, regulators first delimit a group of regulated core services that they continue to regulate and then stipulate a list of constraints that the utility must agree to meet in the future; in exchange, regulators agree to detariff or deregulate entirely other competitive or nonessential services that the utility may offer. As long as no stipulated constraints are violated, the utility may price freely any service; if it reduces costs, it may keep a share of its profits. According to the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA, 1987), social contract agreements of one form or another have been considered or implemented in a majority of American states.

Michael A. Einhorn In continuing to deregulate telecommunications companies, regulators have begun to consider alternative approaches to traditional cost-based price regulation as a means of encouraging monopoly efficiency, promulgating technological innova­ tion, protecting consumers, and reducing administrative costs. Under cost-based regulatory procedures that had been used, prices were designed to recover the regulated company''s costs plus an allowed rate of return on its rate base; this strategy was costly to administer, provided no consistent incentives to cost-ef­ ficiency and technological improvement, afforded many opportunities for strategic misrepresentation of reported costs, and may have encouraged both uneconomic expansion of the utility''s rate base and cross-subsidization of its competitive services. A category of alternative regulatory approaches can be classified broadly as social contracts. Under the general strategy of social contract regulation, regulators first delimit a group of regulated core services that they continue to regulate and then stipulate a list of constraints that the utility must agree to meet in the future; in exchange, regulators agree to detariff or deregulate entirely other competitive or nonessential services that the utility may offer. As long as no stipulated constraints are violated, the utility may price freely any service; if it reduces costs, it may keep a share of its profits. According to the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA, 1987), social contract agreements of one form or another have been considered or implemented in a majority of American states.

Media, Technology and Copyright is an interdisciplinary work that applies economic theory to central topical issues in the law of intellectual property. Based on the author's professional experience as a professor, lecturer, and consultant, the volume represents the first full-length consideration of the diverse topics of law and copyright by a professional economist. Opening chapters of the book involve issues in the analog domain, including the economics of infringement, fair use, property damages, liability rules, compulsory licensing, and publicity rights. Chapters on digital rights include topics related to software, databases, and cyber-law, including digital rights management, file-sharing, music licensing, deep linking, framing, and contributory infringement. The author also brings economic insights to competition law for intellectual property, including antitrust, copyright misuse, and applications in the European Union.Written in non-technical language for an interdisciplinary audience of lawyers, economists, students, artists, and professionals in the content industry, the book provides a comprehensive study for anyone interested in the issues surrounding intellectual property rights.

Media, Technology and Copyright is an interdisciplinary work that applies economic theory to central topical issues in the law of intellectual property. Based on the author's professional experience as a professor, lecturer, and consultant, the volume represents the first full-length consideration of the diverse topics of law and copyright by a professional economist. Opening chapters of the book involve issues in the analog domain, including the economics of infringement, fair use, property damages, liability rules, compulsory licensing, and publicity rights. Chapters on digital rights include topics related to software, databases, and cyber-law, including digital rights management, file-sharing, music licensing, deep linking, framing, and contributory infringement. The author also brings economic insights to competition law for intellectual property, including antitrust, copyright misuse, and applications in the European Union.Written in non-technical language for an interdisciplinary audience of lawyers, economists, students, artists, and professionals in the content industry, the book provides a comprehensive study for anyone interested in the issues surrounding intellectual property rights.

The electric utility industry and its stakeholders in the. United States appear to be at a critical juncture in time. Powerful forces of global proportions are propelling the industry instinctively and in a secular fashion towards restructuring. That the industry will change is a fait accomplii. The nature and timing of the change is still a matter of intense debate, however. Because of the evolution of the industry into its present-day form, i.e. regulated local monopolies in their designated franchise service territories, the relative roles and expectations of various institutions would have to change to conform to the new state in the future. In either encouraging, or allowing this change to happen, society is essentially saying that future societal welfare would be better served by the changed structure contemplated. What that assumption translates into in more direct terms is that creation of future wealth would be better accomplished through redistribution of wealth today. Thoughtful individuals recognize the enormous responsibility placed upon the various entities empowered with jurisdiction over the timing and nature of the structural change. They are trying hard to bring analytical rigor to bear on the debate. One very critical element of this debate on restructuring is the issue of the treatment of transmission. The issue has been variously labeled transmission access, or pricing. Volumes have been written and spoken on this topic.

Electric utilities throughout the world continue to face new challenges involving ownership, market structure, and regulation. There are three related issues at hand. First, should ownership be private or public? Second, what operations should be integrated and where is competition feasible? Third, where is regulation necessary and can it be made more efficient? This volume bears directly upon these concerns. The book contains two sections. The first six articles discuss the British electricity experiment that has privatized and disintegrated the nation's generation, transmission, and distribution companies, introduced market competition for power purchases, and implemented incentive regulation for monopolized transmission and distribution grids. The remaining articles focus on the theater in which significant microeconomic issues will continue to emerge, most immediately in the U.K. and U.S.A. -- the coordination and pricing of transmission.

The electric utility industry and its stakeholders in the. United States appear to be at a critical juncture in time. Powerful forces of global proportions are propelling the industry instinctively and in a secular fashion towards restructuring. That the industry will change is a fait accomplii. The nature and timing of the change is still a matter of intense debate, however. Because of the evolution of the industry into its present-day form, i.e. regulated local monopolies in their designated franchise service territories, the relative roles and expectations of various institutions would have to change to conform to the new state in the future. In either encouraging, or allowing this change to happen, society is essentially saying that future societal welfare would be better served by the changed structure contemplated. What that assumption translates into in more direct terms is that creation of future wealth would be better accomplished through redistribution of wealth today. Thoughtful individuals recognize the enormous responsibility placed upon the various entities empowered with jurisdiction over the timing and nature of the structural change. They are trying hard to bring analytical rigor to bear on the debate. One very critical element of this debate on restructuring is the issue of the treatment of transmission. The issue has been variously labeled transmission access, or pricing. Volumes have been written and spoken on this topic.