Michael J. Brenner – författare

The first years of the post-Cold War era have made clear that it is imperative for the Western allies to pursue a common strategy and a concerted diplomacy in order to secure their interests in Europe. From four national perspectives, the authors examine what must be done for a more egalitarian Alliance to act effectively, on a multilateral basis, in addressing the new security agenda. Each of the contributors has had long experience as a government official or consultant. The stress of the book is on the means and methods of collective decision-making and diplomacy, not organizational architecture. The book concentrates on the issues of Alliance co-operation that look beyond the transition period, its key premise being that the Western partners' ability to work together on a truly multilateral basis will determine their success or failure in meeting the challenges now at the top of their diplomatic agendas.

Providing perspectives from five Western capitals, this multinational study examines the formidable political and structural conditions for effective collaboration between NATO and the United Nations in performing peace-making and peacekeeping missions.

In this volume, Professor Brenner recounts how the United States dealt with the problem of nuclear proliferation in the period from 1974 to 1981 when this book was first published. The year 1974 is critical because of three highly coincidental events: India's explosion of a bomb; an upsurge in the demand for nuclear energy triggered by the oil crisis; and the commercialisation of fuel-producing technologies that could be used for weapons purposes. Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation is at once a narrative account of how nuclear policy was made at the highest levels of the American government and a critical assessment of those policies. Professor Brenner places the chronicle of how policy is shaped within the context of interagency and legislative politics, as well as within the larger context of international conflicts concerning access to and control of nuclear power. The author locates the proliferation problem historically, emphasising the dual personality of atomic power and noting the tendency of military and civilian programmes to diverge steadily until the events of 1974 forced an attempt to bring them into single focus.

The first years of the post-Cold-War era have made abundantly clear that it is imperative for the Western allies to pursue a common strategy and a concerted diplomacy in order to secure their interests in a still unruly Europe.